

Megan Pickup
PhD Candidate, Political Science
Carleton University

The purpose of this paper is to consider current economic and political changes to the world order by relating them to changing domestic contexts over the past decade and a half, specifically the so-called rise of the New Left in Latin America. Previous work on the New Left has focused on themes such as how policies compare both with previous Left and neo-liberal governments in Latin America, but there has been less attention to whether, and if so how, these changes also have global implications. The paper focuses on the relationship between domestic change and the foreign policy behaviour of Brazil, a country in competition for a place as Latin America's regional hegemon and one seeking a higher global status. The focus is on Brazil's partnerships with other countries in the Global South through increased trade and investment, political attention, and development cooperation. I consider what drives Brazilian foreign policy behaviour, arguing that the respective politico-economic determinants of foreign policy differ from those of domestic policy. Through a case study of Brazil's strengthened Southern partnerships in a multi-polar world, we can begin to understand the implications for world order, and why these changes take the contradictory form that they do. In particular, by distinguishing between different actors in the Global South, it is clear that the Brazilian New Left has many faces. There is, in short, no coherent project of South-South engagement, which is a product of the particular combination of institutions and interests behind foreign policy-making in Brazil. The result is that multiple characteristics of South-South ties counteract the foreign policy objective of acting as a global equalizer, and indeed exacerbate the contradictions already found in the PT agenda – visible in the complicated domestic record.

Foreign Policy of the New Left: Explaining Brazil's Southern Partnerships in a Changing World Order

In recent years, many scholars (see Levitsky & Roberts, 2011; Cameron, 2009; Weyland, 2010) have welcomed the emergence of a turn to the Left – a post-neoliberal shift - in Latin America. However, to date most attempts to understand the phenomena of New Left governments have also placed the state at the center of analysis (see Levitsky & Roberts, 2011; an important exception is Riggirozzi & Tussie, 2012), missing what levels such as foreign policy behaviour or regionalism can tell us about post-neoliberal shifts underway in the region. Here, the focus is instead on how the rise to power of the New Left in Brazil has influenced its foreign policy behaviour.

The paper, therefore, investigates the determinants of Brazilian foreign policy in order to better understand the global implications of Brazil's New Left. While outcomes of Brazil's foreign policy can also be examined alone, my contention is that an understanding of how foreign policy is made under the Workers' Party government provides greater insight into the implications of its actions and why they are so contradictory, especially over the longer-term. In particular, favourable economic times allowed Brazil to pursue policy measures that were broadly accommodating of diverse interests despite their disharmony, but the current political and economic crisis faced by Brazil will instead demand harder choices; the examination of key influencers of foreign policy sheds light on what these priorities may be. By determinants, the paper introduces some of the "natural" or external variables that help to position Brazil as an active global player before focusing on four domestic variables, two institutional and two related to key constituencies: institutionally, the role of the Foreign Ministry vis-à-vis government; the relationship between the party and state actions abroad; business interests; and, the social basis of PT support, especially its relationships with civil society. Specifically, I point to these groups and institutional relationships in order to explain why the promotion of Southern ties has taken the form that they have, and to further explore where the determinants of foreign policy contain particularities from those determining domestic policy. The distinction is fundamental, since it means the New Left domestically and externally are not synonymous, and hence the type of New Left government experienced within Brazil is not the same that the rest of the world experiences.

The paper begins with a brief summary of the domestic changes that have accompanied the rise of the New Left in Brazil. Next, the paper will turn to an examination of the foreign policy of the New Left, and in particular discuss the focus on improving relationships with other countries across the Global South in trade, development, investment, and in political terms. I

consider the politico-economic determinants of this shift in approach, arguing that they differ from those that determine domestic policy trajectory. Finally, in order to draw out some of the implications for the global order, the final section looks at some of the advantages and limitations of Brazilian engagement for ‘other Southern giants’, ‘Southern states’, and ‘citizens of the South’. While these categories are not unproblematic, they provide an important sense of how Brazilian influence globally varies. There is not one Brazil in the world, even for the South, whose ties with Brazil have been supposedly promoted as part of a global agenda to remove imbalances in the world order. The potential of a heavyweight, New Left regime spearheading a consistent global project is unlikely.

The Rise of the New Left in Brazil

In general, the advent of the New Left in Brazil is associated with the electoral victory of the Workers’ Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*) (PT) in 2002, paving the way for Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s, popularly referred to as Lula’s, two terms in government: 2003-2011. Moreover, Lula’s administration was followed by two subsequent terms of Dilma Rousseff, his handpicked successor. Her victory in 2014, however, was achieved with only a narrow margin of 51.4% in the second round, with the strength of opposition increasing on both the left and right (La Botz, 2015). Her win marks 16 years in power for the PT, which is the longest that any party has ever consecutively held onto power in Brazilian history (ibid).

The New Left in power in Brazil is a complicated beast. The transition from the previous administration, Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s Brazilian Social Democratic Party (*Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira*) (PSDB), to the PT did not consistently result in clear breaks with previous policies (Burity, 2006; Moraes & Saad-Filho, 2012). As well, and not surprisingly given the length that the PT has been in power, there have been significant shifts in the tenor of PT

administrations, including some dramatic changes between both Presidents' first and second terms. In order to situate the foreign policy choices of Brazil's New Left, this section provides an overview of the contours of domestic policy.

Economically, the advent of the PT marked the clearest continuities with the Cardoso government. Especially in his first administration, Lula displayed a similar disposition towards neoliberal economic reforms as had Cardoso. For example, the priority given to the interests of the financial sector meant that even post-Real Plan (*Plano Real*), where Cardoso managed to successfully temper inflation as financial minister under the Franco administration, inflation control has remained a foremost objective rather than growth or employment (Bin, 2014). At the same time, there were noticeable ruptures, many of which have deep roots in Brazilian tradition. For instance, the strengthening of public companies returned as a government priority (de Almeida, 2013). As well, as I have noted elsewhere (Calvert & Pickup, 2015), domestic investment policies took on a decidedly post-neoliberal character, such as by targeting high employment areas. In general, both the Lula and Dilma administrations took "neo-developmental measures" to ensure gains for both large-scale, domestic capital and for workers (Boito & Berringer, 2014). For some, these policies have been significant in the growth of Brazil's internal market and have resulted in clear gains for workers, especially through increases to the minimum wage, which have had the most impact on Brazil's devastating problem of inequality (Carrillo, 2014; Costa, Fritz, and Sproll, 2015). However, certain problems inherent to the developmentalist agenda, including an over-dependency on commodity exports – described in more detail below – are becoming harder to ignore since growth began to slow in 2011 (ibid; La Botz, 2015). For the previous main beneficiaries of PT policy moreover, the gains are not equalized; for example, state regulation to encourage flexibility and create attractive

conditions for investment, such as profit-related pay (where workers receive supplements if they increase productivity), have not had the beneficial impacts that workers themselves had envisioned and pushed for (Mello e Silva, 2014).

It is in the realm of social policy where the PT is most celebrated for its achievements. Brazil is “recognized as one of the countries with the most remarkable reductions of income inequalities over the last 15 years” (Leubolt, 2013, p. 70). Indeed, it has been argued that the success of social policies domestically prompted the “export of social policies” internationally through Brazil’s provision of technical assistance to other countries in the Global South (de Oliveira, 2010, p. 130). While the ruptures between the PSDB and PT are more obvious in this area however, contrary to the popular narrative, conditional cash transfer programs were first introduced by Cardoso - then grouped under the umbrella of the *Bolsa Família* (Family Grant) and considerably expanded under Lula’s government (Leubolt, 2013). By 2013, *Bolsa Família* was reaching over 13 millions families (ibid). A clear limit of this form of assistance has been that, as the “most dynamic sector of social spending”, investments in other areas have remained low, and before 2004, investments in social services and infrastructure actually declined (ibid). Investments in infrastructure have since increased, including as part of a 2007 “growth acceleration program” that increased public investment more broadly with a focus on infrastructure (Morais & Saad-Filho, 2011). Yet, questions still remain about the quality of such attention, with the 2013 protests of some 8.5 million people signaling “personal aspirations revolving around public transportation, health care, housing, and employment and also the collective sentiment that the society could do better” (La Botz, 2015, p. 5). Burton’s (2012) discussion of education policy as an area where expectations were especially high given the PT’s historical championing of education notes that it was not until Lula’s second term that he

promised to make education a priority. Nevertheless, he criticizes the approach for deviating from earlier experiments and instead adopting a more managerial vision (ibid).

Areas such as economic and social policy also interact in important ways. As Leubolt (2013) describes, Brazil's commitment to neoliberal reforms, and the consequent rise in interest rates, leads to higher debt payments, which in turn impact the amount of resources that can be allocated to social demands. He further demonstrates how the targeting of social benefits to the poorest can create new forms of exclusion, and potentially result in a loss of social solidarity as wealthier Brazilians pursue private services (Soares, 2003 in Leubolt, 2013). Such an analysis seems especially prescient given the polarization in Brazilian society that is increasingly visible since the October 2014 re-election of Dilma. In particular, an ongoing corruption scandal¹ and continued protests have shaken Brazilians' confidence in her administration. A recent survey concluded that 63% of Brazilians would support impeachment proceedings being brought against her (Douglas, 17 April 2015), and polling in April 2015 also revealed she had the worst presidential approval rating in Brazilian history (Braig, Power & Renno, 2015). While there are multiple factors involved in the widespread discontent - and the magnitude of the corruption scandal is certainly significant - the protests have also been considered linked to deeper discontent among the middle- and upper-classes. As one observed noted, "it is not 'the Brazilian people' who are in the streets, but rather a very specific segment of the population whose economic interests are historically opposed to those of the majority" (Pitts, 2015, n.p.). Their indignation stems from the sentiment that the government has benefited the poor and working class to the detriment of themselves (ibid). Discontent is not limited to these classes however, as the exhaustion of the developmentalist model also seems evident vis-à-vis the interests of poorer

¹ The scandal involves the state-owned Petrobrás and politicians receiving kickbacks in a scheme involving the awarding of preferential contracts (Pitts, 2015; Globo, 2015).

classes. For instance, although social programs and increases in pensions linked to the minimum wage saw an increase from 7.7% to 9.2% between the periods of 1995-8 and 1999-2011, the increase in interest payments on debt, combined with reductions in welfare spending in other areas, “more than offset the increase in pensions and social assistance” (Bin, 2014, p. 440).

While the model appears increasingly in crisis, Brazil experienced a number of changes since the PT’s arrival in power that signaled its move in a post-neoliberal or neo-developmental direction. These dynamics have been in constant flux, and it is clear that the current polarization of Brazilian society will also leave its mark on the extent to which domestic policies can stimulate economic growth while addressing exclusion. Next I turn to foreign policy to investigate how the election of a workers’ party has also impacted Brazil’s place in the world.

The Brazilian New Left in the World

In the realm of foreign policy, the neo-developmental current is also visible, with all of its advantages and limits. This section begins with a brief overview of some of the key dimensions of foreign economic, political and development policies, before discussing Brazil’s shift in approach through the prioritization of South-South ties. I argue that the determinants of foreign policy overlap with those of domestic policy, but that they are also delimited by a much different context, changing their fundamental characteristics and their global implications.

Economically, the combination of neoliberal macro-economic goals again combined with a pro-poor focus. For instance, the promotion of outward investment has involved a much more interventionist approach under PT administrations, especially where the Brazilian state attempts to secure gains in manufacturing (Calvert & Pickup, 2015). Funding through Brazil’s *Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social* (BNDES) (National Economic and Social

Development Bank) has been particularly central to both domestic and foreign investment strategies, with the Bank estimated to have disbursed US\$ 6.6 billion on average between 2002 and 2012 (Carrillo, 2014). Until recently, trade performance tended to be strong throughout the PT administrations. In 2011, for example, the first quarter saw a record for exports reached at US\$ 51.2 billion and imports at 48.1 (Doctor, 2012). However, there have also been concerns that the trade model is dysfunctional. In particular, trade gains have been largely a product of high global commodity prices, and this model is increasingly seen as in crisis (Costa, Fritz & Sproll, 2015; Carrillo, 2014). One telling statistic demonstrates that the commodity boom was not substantially met with increases in productivity or technology: while in 2006, Brazil had a trade surplus, with two-thirds representing intermediate or final consumer goods, by 2013 there was a trade deficit of manufactured and semi-manufactured worth US\$ 60 billion, and exports were based largely on commodities (Costa, Fritz & Sproll, 2015).

The New Left has also manifested in particular ways in diplomatic and social policies abroad. Politically, there has been a sense of Brazil's emergence regionally and globally. Daudelin (2010) gives a thorough sense of this activism, from Brazil's predominance in the region, such as its denouncing of the attempted Venezuelan coup, to a "remarkable centrality" in permanent and *ad hoc* global clubs (p. 35; my translation). Finally, it is noteworthy that the PT extended development assistance abroad, "not...in the form of a monetary grant, but technical, with a particular emphasis on the sharing of best practices, provision of qualified personnel, and the granting of advanced study scholarships at Brazilian universities" (Burges, 2005, p. 1141). Although cooperation has declined in recent years in tandem with Brazil's economic downturn, the high point in 2010 saw approximately 300 projects in 37 countries (ABC).

Where the PT most noticeably broke with previous foreign policy behaviour is in its approach: the decision to focus on intensified South-South ties across multiple areas. As Daudelin (2013) explains,

Since at least the beginning of the twenty-fifth century, Brazil's relationship with the United States has been the central preoccupation of its foreign policy and the importance of the current policy shift lies precisely in the extent to which new partnerships and rivalries displace the United States from that position (p. 6).

While different types of engagement overlap in important ways, South-South ties are pronounced in decisions around trade and investment. The Lula administration made a "political choice" to diversify its favoured markets (de Almeida, 2013, p. 20). Mercosul, the Common Market of the South (*Mercado Comum do Sul*) (also known by its Spanish acronym, Mercosur), which was seen as providing opportunities for Brazilian companies (ibid), is a slight exception. Since Mercosul had already been a priority, its importance to the state was more a change in intensity, with the bloc representing a space for trade in manufactured goods and services between members (de Oliveira, 2010). However, its relative economic importance is only understandable once placed alongside changes to its political structure and functioning, such as the 2004 approval of funds to combat imbalances among members (ibid). Other important trading partners of Brazil include IBSA and China. IBSA, connecting India, Brazil, and South Africa, has involved the forging of greater links between the 3 countries. In 2009, trade between Brazil and India hit US\$ 3.12 billion, which was a 29.4% increase from the previous year (Taylor, 2009). Concerning China, which has become Brazil's top trading partner, trade jumped 2000% between 2000 and 2011, reaching US\$ 71.27 billion in 2011 (Cardoso, 2013). Similarly, South-South investment links have increased. Brazil increased attention to Africa in general, especially in natural resources and agricultural sectors (UNCTAD, 2010).

The creation and consolidation of political blocs among the South is also an important element of Brazil's foreign policy, and complements its other actions. Broadly, the intensification of South-South links is portrayed as an attempt to correct power asymmetries plaguing various structures of global governance (Alden & Vieira, 2005). Looking at IBSA, the formation is intended to promote cooperation in diverse areas. A Plan of Action developed after the first meeting in 2004 covered a diverse range of subjects, from education to health (Taylor, 2009). The BRICS, moreover, referring to the strategic partnership of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, has also held summits committing countries to an array of cooperative initiatives (Cardoso, 2013). New announcements of cooperative endeavors appear almost daily. In particular, the launching of a BRICS New Development Bank has attracted attention; the Bank "pointedly exclude[s] Northern donors and emphasize[s] a renewed focus on infrastructure" (Abdenur & da Fonseca, 2013). In the G-20, Brazil has also sought to strengthen political ties with other Southern nations while also assuming a leadership position (Burges, 2005). This point will be returned to below, but it is important to stress that initiatives such as the G-20 or IBSA do not exclude the continued importance of North-South ties (Burges, 2005; Taylor, 2009). Indeed, Lula himself described his aim as to "'maintain good political, economic and commercial relations with the great powers and at the same time *prioritize* the ties with the South'" (2007 in Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007, p. 1321; italics in original).

Development cooperation has been another aspect of Brazil's turn to the South. Development assistance does not usually take the form of financing seen in traditional aid relationships, but instead involves the offer of technical assistance – the transfer of best practices learned from Brazil's own successful social policies. As Burges (2005) argues, this is part of a "psychologically transformative foreign policy agenda in the global south", with emphasis

placed on a re-valuing of Brazilian (and Southern) identity through the projection of self-confidence. Brazil's reach has been truly global, with the turn to Africa perhaps in part motivated by barriers to its ability to exercise regional leadership (Abdenur, 2015). Ventura's (2013) consideration of Brazilian cooperation in health notes how ideas of "structural cooperation" are based on the assumption that principles found domestically – namely, universality, equality, and integral coverage – will support global models that are focused on improving systems holistically rather than targeting specific diseases or weaknesses - the latter being the model associated with traditional aid. In 2012, Brazil had 107 health cooperation projects abroad: 66 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 38 in Africa, and 9 in the Middle East and Asia (ibid). Nevertheless, referencing a study by Torronteguy (2010), she also notes that despite their intentions and while excluding conditionalities found in traditional aid relationships, these relationships may not be able to move away from models based on the passivity of the recipient, or include ways of ensuring accountability (in ibid).

As important as it is to understand the substance of the foreign policy of the PT in power, attention to the determinants of this approach can help to explain why this shift has occurred as a first step towards understanding its consequences. First, however, it is important to note that there has been a widespread sense that domestic policies and foreign policy have been in tension; the PT was "talking Left abroad and acting right at home" (Rohter, 2010 in Daudelin, 2013, p. 5). Thus, domestic and foreign policies may not necessarily contain the same roots, even where they demonstrate similar proclivities toward an activist, pro-poor state. At the same time, despite where there are important differences vis-à-vis the domestic approach, this "talking left" abroad should not mislead us from the extremely pragmatic course foreign policy has taken. Rather than an ideological project, as former Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained,

“Brazil has to articulate political, economic and technological alliances with peripheral states of the international system to protect its interests” (2006 in Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007, pp. 1314-5).

The actions of the PT abroad have been supported by a combination of external and “natural” variables. The proximity of Brazil to the US has been particularly influential on its foreign policy decisions, and so has relative stability in the region since the early 20th century (Soares de Lima & Hirst, 2006). Brazil has also had latent potential to be a significant power given its size in terms of surface and population (Daudelin, 2010).

Changes in the international environment have also been central to giving the PT room to maneuver, especially given the perceived illegitimacy and inefficiency of global governance systems (ibid). By the end of Cardoso’s second term, he approached the Free Trade Area of the Americas, for instance, as representative of the US’ uncompromising, unilateral agenda, which was not accommodating of reforms that would help to correct asymmetries in power (Vigevani & de Oliveira, 2007). In general, the rise of other powers, and in particular China, has also facilitated what Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007) refer to as “autonomy through diversification”.

This strategy involves an:

Adherence to international norms and principles by means of South-South alliances, including regional alliances, and through agreements with non-traditional partners...trying to reduce asymmetries in external relations with powerful countries (ibid, p. 1313).

In various ways, the external context and key characteristics of Brazil were favourable to a more active foreign policy.

Turning to domestic factors, foreign policy behaviour has been influenced by institutional arrangements and by several key constituencies. First, the institutional relationship between Foreign Affairs and the government has been significant. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

(*Ministério das Relações Exteriores*) (MRE), popularly known as Itamaraty, saw an increase in its role during the 1990s as regional integration, increasingly complex multilateral negotiations, etc. all demanded skilled diplomacy (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007). Itamaraty has historically had a significant degree of autonomy, maintaining its separation from other ministries and agencies (Cason & Power, 2009). In 2001, a survey of different members of Brazil's "foreign policy community" found that there was a strong belief in the idea of an autonomous Itamaraty (de Souza, 2001 in Cason & Power, 2009). For instance, one respondent argued that, "Brazil has a very large bureaucracy and there is little or no democratic oversight...there is no negotiated agenda with society" (ibid, p. 120). Soares de Lima and Hirst (2006) have also suggested that there is a certain path dependency at work in Itamaraty, where ideas that have once held legitimacy are difficult to dispel. Path dependency would explain the continued resonance of earlier paradigms in Brazil; even the more assertive turn led by Lula has drawn parallels with earlier periods, such as the emphasis on South-South ties seen under Geisel (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007), and this resilience would also explain the continuation of neoliberal policy. Similar to Lula, these diplomats have had a long-standing interest in intensifying Brazil's presence overseas (Daudelin, 2010). The leadership of Celso Amorim as Minister of Foreign Affairs (2003-2011) also pushed a specific version of this intensification as Amorim "endorsed and enhanced" Lula's vision of focusing more on other developing countries than on the US and Europe (Cardoso, 2013, p. 43).

What is striking about the PT's foreign policy specifically is that it has been subject to domestic debate (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007) as historically, foreign policy-making has been seen as detached from public opinion (Daudelin, 2010). With Lula however, opposition parties, especially the PSDB and the Liberal Front Party (*Partido da Frente Liberal*) (PFL), were

concerned with what they perceived as a lack of effort to maintain relations with traditional countries (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007). In part, the heightened politicization of foreign policy is explained by processes of pluralization, influenced by such changes as Brazil's return to democracy (Cason & Power, 2009). Cason and Power (2009) put forward the argument that, under Cardoso and Lula, policy-making was marked by two trends: "the *pluralization of actors* and the *advent of presidentially led diplomacy*" (p. 119; italics in original). Thus, for example, the first trend involved greater civil society participation (ibid). However, concerning the Lula administration specifically, both of these trends are also very much related to a specific politicization of foreign policy according to PT beliefs and principles. Again, despite Lula's continuation of previous macroeconomic policies, there has been the contention that "it is in foreign relations and international politics that the Lula government most resembles the discourse of the PT" (Almeida 2004 in Cason & Power, 2009, p. 162). While the validity of this statement is another issue, and is explored below, it is important to note that foreign policy has been emphatically pushed as a PT agenda. Brazil's leadership in trade talks provides one illustration. Meeting with the G-20 before the WTO, Lula sought to address policies that were on the whole disfavoring the South. As he stated in 2003,

Endowed with legitimacy and representativeness, the G-20 is changing the dynamics of multilateral trade diplomacy...the G-20 helps to prevent the parameters of the agriculture debate in the WTO from being imposed by the protectionist interests of a few members (da Silva in Cason & Power, 2009, p. 130).

In general, discourse around correcting global asymmetries resonates with PT ideology of anti-imperialism (Cason & Power, 2009). Branding actions abroad as the PT's also helps to explain why foreign policy can no longer claim the autonomy it once held, logically becoming an area of deeper democratic contention.

As well, understanding the determinants of the South-South turn must include an examination of some of the key constituencies influencing decisions. de Oliveira (2010) claims that beyond Presidential charisma or an engaged Itamaraty, foreign policy also “reflects the new situation and interests that are well-founded in modern Brazil. The emergence of new elites has led Brazil to stop being a rule-taker” (p. 138). The importance of foreign policy for the PT on an ideological level thus cannot obscure the pragmatic sides of active regional and global engagement. Rather than marginalizing business elites, their influence was extended under PT administrations, especially those representing agricultural interests and exporters (Cason & Power, 2009). This influence was clear in a number of appointments made by Lula, including Luiz Fernando Furlan and Roberto Rodrigues to two key ministries, Agriculture, and the Ministry of Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade respectively, who “served as direct communication channels to agricultural interests and exporters” (ibid, p. 128). There are some important exceptions to the dominance of an agribusiness elite. For example, involvement in Mercosul has consistently benefited Brazil’s manufactured goods and services (de Oliveira, 2007). However, the stark current imbalance in favour of natural resources of Brazilian exports underlines the importance of these actors. Business objectives, of course, are not homogenous, but these constituencies have been key in moving the South-South agenda forward. Other business groups, especially larger ones, have been resistant to South-South trade since it seemed to be based on political rather than economic criteria (Doctor, 2012). Similarly, Burges (2005) describes how state-owned corporations and financial organizations played an important role in encouraging Brazilian businesses, who were otherwise hesitant, to take advantage of Southern opportunities. Finally, many groups are outright harmed by the Chinese relationship given that

the relationship is so skewed in favour of China and that cheaper manufactures are flooding into Brazil (Cervo, 2010; de Almeida, 2013).

The lack of accommodation of the domestic social base of the PT has also been a key determinant of behaviour abroad. Domestically, support of the PT has been from urban social movements and unions, with rural demands continuing to be marginalized by the government, unions, and the urban worker base (de Castro & Motta, 2015). In principle, these actors should be equally supportive of domestic and foreign behaviour, or perhaps even, if claims that the government's actions abroad more closely resemble PT values are true, more satisfied with foreign policy. For instance, although de Oliveira (2006) acknowledges that once in power the PT's counter-hegemony was much more limited than previous local and state experiences would have suggested, he maintains that efforts to "export" social policies abroad, such as to Haiti, are largely positive: "an alternative to occupation and food distribution, Brazil's actions in Haiti have engaged the best of its social and development policies" (p. 131). Such actions would superficially appear to support the demands of social movements and unions, whose demands generally call for a more interventionist, protectionist state, such as through the extension of social coverage, inclusion into the labour market, and promotion of participatory governance arrangements. However, there are many more tensions in Brazil's activities abroad than these observations would suggest. Considering increased economic activities for example, investments from BNDES have been critiqued for their social and environmental harms (Ventura, 2013). Development cooperation moreover, where social participation would seem most likely as well as an area more harmonious with PT beliefs, has not necessarily involved or gained the support of these actors. In particular, cooperation abroad has been reluctant to engage civil society despite the contention, from both civil society actors and the state, that these programs are based

on successful domestic policies that have depended on civil society mobilization and involvement (Pickup, 2015). The state's reluctance seems related a desire to maintain the historical autonomy of decision-makers, with processes of pluralization appearing much more gradual for these actors than they have been for various business interests or even opposition parties.

Together, a shifting institutional environment and changed state-society relationships suggest that there will be particularities in terms of how domestic versus foreign policy is made in Brazil. The distinction is crucial, for it provides a necessary caveat that understanding the global implications of the New Left's emergence cannot automatically be translated from its domestic behaviour. Finally, before turning to the consequences of PT action abroad, it is worth stressing that this analysis captures only the general dynamics of PT support. Indeed, more specific cases or sectoral analyses would capture in detail the various pressure groups influencing policy, and under what conditions particular actors can exert influence. Vieira's (2013) article on "Brazilian foreign policy in the context of global climate norms" provides an important model, as he describes in detail how the domestic debate on climate change has shifted over time, identifying those that fall broadly between "environmentalist" and "development" camps respectively. In terms of the latter, a group defined by their resistance to regulation in the Amazon for such reasons as nationalism, he identifies actors as diverse (and often diametrically opposed) as "the so-called *ruralista* lobby in the Congress led by soya, logging, and cattle farmers", and the MST (*Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra*) (Landless Rural Workers' Movement), a group of landless peasants and rural workers fighting for agrarian reform (ibid, p. 381).

Global Implications of an Activist Brazil

Based on an understanding of the particular determinants of Brazil's intensification of South-South ties, this section aims to develop how a greater Brazilian presence in the world affects Brazil's partners. The analysis does not capture all of the potential limits and advantages for Brazil's partners in terms of their political, economic, and developmental dimensions, but it does underline some of the key dynamics encountered between Brazil and other Southern partners. The analysis suggests that, foremost, there is a need to disaggregate among Brazilian partners to understand what an activist Brazil means for the world. Here the distinction is made between 'other Southern giants', 'Southern states', and 'citizens of the South', not as a way of creating or reifying these boundaries, but as an initial way of acknowledging the differentiated potential of Brazilian partners to take advantage of what is offered, and the particularities of engagement.

'Other Southern giants/emerging powers':

As was discussed, Brazil has formed a number of important partnerships with other emerging powers, including as part of IBSA, the BRICS, and its special relationship with China. As well, efforts to consolidate links between the countries have had as much emphasis in political and ideological projects as they have economic. Three points can be made about the consequences of these ties. First, many of these countries follow a more state-led politico-economic model. The accompanying of Lula and Dilma by Brazilian companies and extensive investments abroad from BNDES speak to the active involvement of the state in business relations (Daudelin, 2010; Cervo, 2010). There is debate over what the domestic significance of a neo-developmental state is, with several authors (Radice, 2008; Leftwich, 2008; Leiva, 2008) pointing to the difficulty that the state is not a neutral body that can escape politics. The most

obvious problem is that there are limits to how many diverse demands the government can satisfy – in the case of Brazil, this is more and more glaring with changed global circumstances. These diverse interests only further multiply internationally.

Moreover, does state interventionism at home automatically become the model pushed for abroad? Taylor (2009) has noted that although these alliances demand a re-thinking of the asymmetries of global governance, in fact “the elites from key developing countries demand *greater* neo-liberalism, not less” (p. 46). The obvious case in point is G-20 lobbying at the WTO for Western countries to abandon their selective protectionist policies and more fully adhere to the regime (ibid). Nunes de Oliveira, Onuki, and Emmanuel de Oliveira’s (2006) conceptually sophisticated inquiry into the basis of South-South coalitions, in particular IBSA, asks whether they are exogenously or endogenously driven, and whether they are more offensive or defensive. They argue that there is the possibility that their identities converge, and that although these countries tend to have divergent interests, it is possible that these differences can be overcome by exogenous and defensive elements, such as the security climate (ibid). Thus, in spite of a general demand to correct global imbalances, these powers may seek to reform structures in ways that actually deepen the neoliberal project to their benefit, or simply that their more concrete objectives may have little in common with each other and hence prevent collective action.

Lastly, the partnerships between the globe’s emerging powers are themselves imbalanced, especially when considering the relationship between China and Brazil. The Chinese-Brazilian business relationship is highly uneven, such as when considering the composition of trade. This challenge has led to schisms within PT support, as agricultural elites benefit hugely from the partnership while industry concern mounts, also generating opposition from the PDSB (Cardoso, 2013). In 2004, there was a refusal to recognize China as a market

economy because of pressure from groups like the National Confederation of Industry (CNI), a designation promised to Hu Jintao during his first state visit to Brazil (ibid). The sheer strength of China also impacts the political clout of Brazil. In a sense, the position of regional giant in Latin America is not a contest between countries like Brazil and Argentina, but is already held by China. In 1990, China exported only 0.7% of its overall exports to Latin America, but this has risen to 7.8% by 2004; Brazil, although also demonstrating an increase from 5.3 to 6.5% in the same period, had been outpaced (Cardoso, 2013). In sum, the potential for Brazil's partnerships with other giants to impact global relations must include considerations as to the proposed role of the state in managing the economy, the objectives of these powerful blocs, and their divergent capabilities.

‘Southern states’:

Brazil's partnerships with other emerging countries already suggest a number of implications for the “average” Southern state, but there are also more direct effects. One of the defining aspects of Brazil's partnerships with less powerful states in the South is actually that they are minimal. In fact, across all areas of engagement, from investment to development cooperation, Brazil seems to equally neglect those countries already marginalized in a neoliberal global order. In UNCTAD's (2010) report on “South-South Cooperation: Africa and the new forms of development partnership”, they conclude that in general “there is the tendency for trade, investment and official flows between Africa and developing country partners to concentrate in resource-rich, politically strategic and large countries in the region” (p. 106). For Brazil, what defines politically strategic has been its relationships with other lusophone countries, which thus represents somewhat of a divergence from traditional relationships (excluding Portugal). These relationships have also been long-standing. Indeed, Petrobrás began investing in Angola in 1979

(Abdenur, 2015). Although Brazil is an important export destination for Africa, very few African countries export to Brazil. In 2008 for example, Nigeria alone accounted for 38% of African exports destined for Brazil (UNCTAD, 2010). In general, there is a tendency for Brazil to import minerals, and export agricultural commodities, as well as arms and military equipment (Abdenur, 2015), furthering problematic trade compositions between Africa and the rest of the world. This imbalance leads Taylor (2009) to quip that, “talk of automatic win-win solutions arising from South-South trade is economically illiterate and smacks of infantile Third Worldism” (p. 54). Nevertheless, in relation to other emerging powers, there is less of an emphasis on access to these resources given Brazil itself is an energy superpower (Stolte, 2013).

Yet ideas found in South-South discourse, even if “merely rhetorical statements...still have an impact on Brazil’s relations with other countries” (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007, p. 1318). What Burges (2005) has described as an agenda for re-valuing what it means to be Southern is a part of a re-making of “global economic geography” (p. 1144). The idea is captured nicely in a report from the World Bank and Ipea² (2011) that notes that, “*the new Africa coincides with a global Brazil*” (p. 3; italics in original). There is something powerful about the Southern project as a re-valuing of identity and as symbolic of solidarity. This political clout is difficult to quantify, but certainly does appear to mitigate other negative consequences of Brazilian leadership. In Haiti for instance, despite Brazil’s armed presence, and its marginal efforts to promote development, there is widespread sentiment that Haitians love Brazilians (author’s interviews, 2015). One interesting exception to the minimal engagement that Brazil has with many Southern countries is that the importance its places on sovereignty means that it has ties with countries otherwise considered “pariahs” of the international community (Abdenur, 2015, p.

² Brazil’s Institute for Applied Economic Research (*Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada*)

333). These engagements raise a number of important questions around standard-setting, such as whether norms – such as those of “good governance” - are developed or obstructed through engagement (Woods, 2005).

This relative neglect of the non-emerging South is not across the board, however, and if Brazil has little influence on the world, it certainly does have influence in some places (Daudelin, 2010). As might be expected, Brazil is much more significant in its own backyard, although these relationships are not without tension. Mercosul, as one example, has been prioritized for the opportunities it offers to Brazilian companies; the bloc has been a space for Brazil to continue its industrialization processes, with Brazil accounting for two-thirds of its trade (Briceño Ruiz, 2007; Malmud & Gardini, 2012). At the same time, the relationship displays distinct post-neoliberal qualities, as non-state actors found an increased role in the institution as Lula opened up space for social movements to participate (Almeida, 2007). In addition to funds discussed earlier meant to correct some of the imbalances between members, the bloc has also been the focus of other redistributive concerns. Mercosul Social, designed to support the formulation of social policies at the regional level, had only a limited role in the early years, but has received increased attention since 2000 (Mercosul n.d.; Mercosul Social, 2012). For example, in 2007, the Mercosul Social Institute was created, and the Declaration of Principles for Mercosul Social was adopted - the foundation for the preparation of a Strategic Plan for Social Action (ibid). Of course, these initiatives reflect not only the leadership of Brazil, but also a broader turn to the Left that many, certainly not all, countries in Latin America have undergone. When assessing the outcomes of regional relationships, a key factor is the complicated link that ties have with Brazil’s assertion of more global leadership, especially once Brazil’s relationships with other emerging powers are considered. There is the assumption that a country must have

regional leadership to truly be a global power, but there is also the possibility that international recognition can help consolidate regional authority, guaranteeing the submission of neighbours (Alden & Vieira, 2005). Where Brazil is not outright resisted moreover, nor is it accepted as the regional leader (Daudelin, 2010). As one indication of the limits to Brazilian leadership, its candidacy for a permanent seat on the Security Council was not accepted by Argentina or Colombia (Soares de Lima & Hirst, 2006).

In the region, Brazil's relationship with Haiti is especially telling of the dilemmas of engagement. The problem with raising aspirations about Brazil's leadership is that it can lead to frustrated expectations, and it can also generate resistance (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007). In Haiti, Brazil had the opportunity to test out its principles around security and multilateralism, especially its concern to re-conceptualize peacekeeping and enforcement, such as by emphasizing the economic roots of insecurity (Soares de Lima & Hirst, 2006). Brazil has played a leadership role in MINUSTAH, the UN's Stabilization Mission in Haiti, since its inception in 2004. Haiti has also been an important beneficiary of Brazilian development cooperation (ABC & BRICS Policy Center, 2013; ODI, 2010). Brazil also scaled-up humanitarian support following the 2010 earthquake, engagement which is "important not only for the prestige reason of demonstrating that Brazil is not an impoverished country, but also for the larger foreign-policy reason of staking a direct claim to a seat at major global governance tables" (Burges, 2014, p. 363). Crucially, peacekeeping and other forms of cooperation are also about widening Brazilian influence in the Caribbean, and simultaneously edging out the US (Cervo, 2010). These diverse initiatives have not been without criticism, such as increased hostility to Brazilian troops, and the perception that in practice Brazil's approach to peacekeeping has differed little from what has been seen traditionally, such as a problematic focus on peace enforcement rather than

development and reconstruction (Seitenfus, 2014). Indeed, initiatives also intersect in important ways. For instance, development cooperation projects have been perceived as a way for Brazilian soldiers to be “free to do their business without ill will” (author’s interviews, 2015). In Haiti, the pragmatic side of increasing South-South ties has certainly demonstrated where Brazilian interests versus Haitian benefits can diverge.

‘Citizens of the South’:

Finally, to tease out the potential consequences of Brazil’s increased relations with the South, two final conclusions can be drawn. First, it is important to stress that these relationships are primarily state-state, especially as the financial crisis has given Brazil room to promote such an approach (Abdenur, 2015). Thus, it is necessary to consider what this means for average citizens in the Global South. In short, if Brazil has seen problems in participatory democracy at home, they are magnified abroad. Carrillo (2014) convincingly argues – and is unfortunately supported by the current scandal - that the difficulty of a statist political economy is when vested interests encourage the state to base its support on criteria other than performance. If, as he maintains, new developmentalist agendas face problems in needing mechanisms for accountability and oversight (ibid), then the exclusion of Brazilian civil society, and the absence of efforts to include foreign civil society groups in actions abroad, further aggravate these tendencies. Zibechi (2012) describes various instances of resistance to Brazil regionally, including in Paraguay where there have been confrontations between Brazilian companies and those fighting for land reform. Globally, in particular Brazil’s support of the pro-agribusiness elite presents real problems for representing small farmers and the peasantry (Daudelin, 2010; Taylor, 2009). Nevertheless, development cooperation specifically has made some important inroads in addressing Brazil’s preoccupation with global poverty. Its cooperative efforts tend to

adopt models based on successful, interventionist domestic programs, such as where “virtuous circles” link local production to guaranteed acquisition, and in turn further support feeding programs (Ipea, 2010). However, similar to the links between types of engagement in Haiti, Ventura (2013) is critical of their trade-offs; considering health, she writes that, “publicly-run initiatives in the field of health come across as a compensation for the type of South-South cooperation that is based on market interests” (p. 100).

Lastly, these South-South ties exist in relation to the North, and in the context of a neoliberal global political economy. Despite Brazil and other emerging countries’ shared commitment to resisting unequal, Western global governance the continued importance of the North, combined with the paradox that many of Brazil’s interests are also in upholding these same structures, places important constraints on how much a neo-developmental agenda can alter existing relations. In particular, a need to confer legitimacy on their actions is not simply something that Brazil looks to the South for; the construction of Brazilian leadership also demands that the North accept it (Alden & Vieira, 2005): where Brazil is seen as offering innovative social policies, as representing Latin America, etc. As I have argued in the case of Brazilian development assistance, activism abroad is part of a general positioning of itself as having risen in relation to the West, and technical cooperation specifically helps achieve this by emphasizing the desired moral dimension: the rise of a benevolent partner (Pickup, 2015). The difficulty is where playing to the Western audience compromises (diverse) objectives of Southern partners, such as those peasants and small-scale farmers resisting trade liberalization. Typically, the results can be expected to be mixed, as pursuing benefits for Brazil may occasionally also benefit interests in the South and at other times the North. As Burges (2013) describes it, Brazil is a “bridge”, whereby,

The sorts of positions that Brazil is advancing...appear consonant with the existing structures and norms of the international system, but turned slightly to reflect a set of priorities and interests that do not fit neatly into the implicit agreements and understandings that the US, Europe and Japan have used to run the world for the last 50 years.

As well, the continued economic and political weight of the North, such as in terms of trade, also signifies that they will influence whether North and South can interact on more equitable terms (Burgess, 2005; Taylor, 2009).

Conclusion: The Many Faces of Brazilian Activism Abroad

The objective of this paper was to probe the implications of the rise of the New Left in Brazil for the rest of the world. After summarizing some of the main contours of domestic policy under PT administrations, the paper presented the main lines of foreign policy. In particular, the PT's emphasis on cultivating relationships with the South was approached as a striking element of foreign policy behaviour that cuts across various dimensions of interaction. Moreover, the paper traced several important institutional and interest-related determinants of Brazilian foreign policy, which, while demonstrating some overlap with the drivers of domestic policy, also contain their own particularities. Specifically, I argued that factors such as Itamaraty's historic autonomy, or low but increasing interest in foreign policy in society at large, have also shaped the contradictory form in which these Southern partnerships take hold. Finally, the paper sought to understand the outcomes of the New Left in the world by examining what the relationships have meant for different partners. In particular, by disaggregating the South, it is possible to see how much the implications of Brazilian engagement vary. On one extreme, an emerging power like China has the upper hand in this relationship, while many peasants are hurt by the actions of a Brazil supported by agribusiness interests. There is, in short, no coherent project of South-

South engagement, which is a product of the particular combination of institutions and interests behind foreign policy-making in Brazil. Institutional barriers to participation in decisions have been decreasing, but the weight of agribusiness interests, with little counterbalancing from civil society actors, seems to prevail. The result is that multiple characteristics of South-South ties counteract the foreign policy objective of acting as a global equalizer, and indeed exacerbate the contradictions already found in the PT agenda – visible in the complicated domestic record. While more disappointing sides of South-South ties may suggest continuity with the harms of the current neoliberal order however, the argument is not that there have been no changes. Despite the limitations for Southern partners, this is not the status quo, even if it hardly resembles the alternatives to a neoliberal global order that South-South rhetoric suggests.

References

- Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC) (n.d.). *Coordenação geral de cooperação técnica entre países em desenvolvimento*. Sobre a ABC. Accessed April 23, 2015 from the Internet: <http://www.abc.gov.br/SobreAbc/Direcao/CGPD>
- ABC & BRICS Policy Center (2013). *O Brasil e a Cooperação Sul-Sul*. Accessed April 23, 2015 from the Internet: <http://bricspolicycenter.org/homolog/Event/Evento/596>
- Addenur, A. (2015). Organisation and politics in South-South Cooperation: Brazil's technical cooperation in Africa. *Global Society*, 29, 321-338.
- Abdenur, A. & J.M. Marques da Fonseca (2013). The North's growing role in South-South Cooperation: keeping the foothold. *Third World Quarterly*, 34, 1475-1491.
- Acharya, A. (2004). How ideas spread: whose norms matter? Norm localization and institutional change in Asian regionalism. *International Organization*, 58, 239-275.
- Alden, C. & M. Vieira (2005). The new diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil, India and trilateralism. *Third World Quarterly*, 26, 1077-1095.
- Almeida, P.R. (2007). O Brasil como ator regional e como emergente global: estratégias de política externa e impacto na nova ordem internacional. *Revista Cena Internacional*, 9, 7-36.
- Bin, D. (2014). The class character of macroeconomic policies in Brazil of the *Real*. *Critical Sociology*, 40, 431-449.
- Boito, B. & T. Berringer (2014). Social classes, neodevelopmentalism, and Brazilian foreign policy under Presidents Lula and Dilma. *Latin American Perspectives*, 198, 95–109.
- Braig, M., T.J. Power & L. Rennó (2015). Brazil 2015 and beyond: the aftermath of the 2014 elections and implications for Dilma's second term. *LASAForum*, XLVI, 15-17.

- Briceño Ruiz, J. (2007). Strategic regionalism and regional social policy in the FTAA process. *Global Social Policy*, 7, 294-315.
- Burges, S. (2014). Brazil's international development co-operation: old and new motivations. *Development Policy Review*, 32, 355-374.
- Burges, S. (2013). Brazil as a bridge between old and new powers? *International Affairs*, 89, 577-594.
- Burges, S. (2005). *Auto-estima* in Brazil. *International Journal*, 60, 1133-1151.
- Burity, J.A. (2006). Reform of the state and the new discourse on social policy in Brazil. *Latin American Perspectives*, 33, 67 - 88. Translated by L. Hallewell.
- Burton, G. (2012). Flaying Freire? The Workers' Party and education policy in Brazil, 1980-2007. *International Review of Education*, 58, 91-108.
- Cabral & Weinstock (2010). Brazilian technical cooperation for development: drivers, mechanics and future prospects. London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI).
- Calvert, J. & M. Pickup (forthcoming). The politics of investment in the Americas: Canada, Brazil, and the (post-) neoliberal state. *Canadian Journal of Foreign Policy*.
- Cameron, M.A. (2009). Latin America's left turns: beyond good and bad. *Third World Quarterly*, 30, 331-348.
- Cardoso, D. (2013). China-Brazil: a strategic partnership in an evolving world order. *East Asia*, 30, 35-51.
- Carrillo, I. (2014). The new developmentalism and the challenges to long-term stability in Brazil. *Latin American Perspectives*, 198, 59-74.
- Cason, J.W. & T.J. Power (2009). Presidentialization, pluralization, and the rollback of Itamaraty: explaining change in Brazilian foreign policy making in the Cardoso-Lula era. *International Political Science Review*, 30, 117-140.
- Cervo, A. (2010). Brazil's rise on the international scene: Brazil and the world. *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 53.
- Costa, S., B. Fritz, & M. Sproll (2015). Dilma 2.0: from economic growth with distribution to stagnation and increasing inequalities? *LASAForum*, XLVI, 21-24.
- Daudelin, J. (2013). Coming of age? Recent scholarship on Brazilian foreign policy. *Latin American Research Review*, 48, 204-217.
- Daudelin, J. (2010). Le Brésil comme puissance: portée et paradoxes. *Problèmes d'Amérique latine*, 78, 29-46.
- de Almeida, P.R. (2013). Brazilian trade policy in historical perspective: constant features, erratic behaviour. *Revista de Direito Internacional*, 10, 11-27.
- de Castro, F. & R. Motta (2015). Environmental politics under Dilma: changing relationships between the civil society and the state. *LASAForum*, XLVI, 25-27.
- de Oliveira, M.A. (2010). Sources of Brazil's counter-hegemony. *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 53, 125-141.
- de Oliveira, A.J.N, J. Onuki & E. de Oliveira (2006). Coalizões Sul-Sul e Multilateralismo: Índia, Brasil e África. *Contexto Internacional*, 28, 465-504.
- Doctor, M. (2012). Brazil's new government and trade: an evaluation of policy and performance. *Critical Sociology*, 38, 799-807.
- Douglas, B. (24 April 2015). Brazil activists to walk 600 miles for 'free markets, lower taxes and privatisation'. *The Guardian*. Accessed August 3, 2015 from the Internet: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/24/brazil-activists-march-free-markets-margaret-thatcher-rand-paul>

- IPEA (2010). *Brazilian cooperation for international development 2010*.
- La Botz, D. (2015). Brazil: Lula, Rousseff, and the Workers Party establishment in power. *New Politics*, 15, 53-60.
- Leftwich, A. (2008). Developmental states, effective states and poverty reduction: the primacy of politics. *UNRISD Flagship Report: Combating Poverty and Inequality*. Accessed August 9, 2015 from the Internet: [http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/httpNetITFramePDF?ReadForm&parentunid=EE2D4DF653F6077BC1257A5D004C7E5E&parentdoctype=paper&netitpath=80256B3C005BCCF9/%28httpAuxPages%29/EE2D4DF653F6077BC1257A5D004C7E5E/\\$file/Leftwichweb.pdf](http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/httpNetITFramePDF?ReadForm&parentunid=EE2D4DF653F6077BC1257A5D004C7E5E&parentdoctype=paper&netitpath=80256B3C005BCCF9/%28httpAuxPages%29/EE2D4DF653F6077BC1257A5D004C7E5E/$file/Leftwichweb.pdf)
- Leiva, F.I. (2008). Toward a critique of Latin American neostructuralism. *Latin American Politics & Society*, 50, 1-25.
- Leubolt, B. (2013). Institutions, discourse and welfare: Brazil as a distributional regime. *Global Social Policy*, 13, 66-83.
- Levitsky, L. & K. M. Roberts (Eds.) (2011). *The resurgence of the Latin American left*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- Malamud, A. & G.L. Gardini (2012). Has regionalism peaked? The Latin American quagmire and its lessons. *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs*, 47, 116-133.
- Mello e Silva, L. (2014). The state, unions, and work reorganization: lessons from today's Brazil. *Latin American Perspectives*, 198, 22-41.
- Mercosul, (n.d.). *Saiba mais sobre o MERCOSUL*. Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Accessed August 9, 2015 from the Internet: <http://www.mercosul.gov.br/saiba-mais-sobre-o-mercosul>
- Mercosul Social (2012). *Linha do tempo*. Instituto Social de Mercosur. Accessed August 9, 2015 from the Internet: http://ismercosur.org/pt-br/mercosul-social/?doing_wp_cron=1365988448.3468420505523681640625
- Morais, L. & A. Saad-Filho (2011). Brazil beyond Lula: forging ahead or pausing for breath? *Latin American Perspectives*, 177, 38, 31-44.
- Pickup, M. (2015). Ambiguity and emerging powers: Brazilian development assistance in a changing world order. *Canadian Political Studies Association*. Ottawa.
- Pitts, B. (4 September 2015). Who's protesting in Brazil and why? *North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)*. Accessed August 3, 2015 from the Internet: <https://nacla.org/news/2015/04/09/who%E2%80%99s-protesting-brazil-and-why>
- Radice, H. (2008). The developmental state under global neoliberalism. *Third World Quarterly*, 29, 1153-1174.
- Riggirozzi, P. & D. Tussie (Eds.) (2012). *The rise of post-hegemonic regionalism. The case of Latin America*. New York: Springer.
- Seitenfus, R. (2014). *Haiti: dilemas e fracassos internacionais*. Ijuí: Editora UNIJUÍ.
- Soares de Lima, M. & M. Hirst (2006). Brazil as an intermediate state and regional power: action, choice and responsibilities. *International Affairs*, 82, 21-40.
- Stolte, C. (2013). Brazil in Africa: seeking international status, not resources. *Harvard International Review*, 34, 4, 63-67.
- Taylor, I. (2009). 'The South will rise again'? New alliances and global governance: The India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum. *Politikon*, 36, 45-58.
- United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2010). South-South

- Cooperation: Africa and the new forms of development partnership. *Economic Development in Africa Report 2010*. New York: UN Publication.
- Ventura, D. (2013). Public health and Brazilian foreign policy. *International Journal on Human Rights*, 95-113.
- Vieira, M. (2013). Brazilian foreign policy in the context of global climate norms. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 9, 369-386.
- Vigevani, T. & G. Cepaluni (2007). Lula's foreign policy and the quest for autonomy through diversification. *Third World Quarterly*, 28, 1309-1326.
- Weyland, K. (2010). The performance of leftist governments in Latin America. Conceptual and theoretical issues. In K. Weyland, R.L. Madrid, and W. Hunter (Eds.) *Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings* (1-27). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Woods, N. (2008). Whose aid? Whose influence? China, emerging donors and the silent revolution in development assistance. *International Affairs*, 84, 1205-1221.
- Zibechi, R. (2012). *The new Brazil: regional imperialism and the new democracy*. Oakland, CA: AK Press.