

DRAFT ONLY DO NOT QUOTE

STRIKES, BREAD RIOTS AND BLOCKADES:
MOZAMBICAN WORKERS AND COMMUNITIES IN RESISTANCE

By

Judith Marshall

Research Associate, CERLAC

York University, Toronto, Canada

judithmarshall9@outlook.com

21st Century Protests: New Actors, New Forms, New Triggers, New Targets

More than 100 activists from grass roots movements fighting for land or housing or work converged on the Vatican in October 2014 for a World Meeting of Popular Movements. The participants ranged from cardboard recyclers in Buenos Aires to the homeless in Cape Town, from *indignados* fighting the austerity agenda in Spain to the national slum dwellers association in India. Two grassroots activists from Mozambique were among the participants. One came from UNAC, the national peasants' union that today supports peasant farming communities in their fight against dispossession through land grabs by mining companies and big agro-industry projects. The other came from ASSOTSI, a national organization of informal sector workers, living on the periphery of one of the world's poorest countries where even formal sector workers earn far from than a living wage.

The gathering was a direct initiative of Pope Francis, long a familiar figure among the poor and excluded in the shanty towns of Buenos Aires as Bishop Bergoglio. He brought to Rome a passionate desire for a church for the poor, one that would accompany and support those on the periphery where, against all efforts by the rich and powerful to dispossess them, discard them, and relegate them to sacrifice zones, the poor continue to invent ways to survive and resist.

Today as Pope, he is arguably the strongest establishment voice speaking out about the obscenity of global inequality. More importantly, whether in Vatican statements directed to the faithful or in dialogue with world leaders at events like G20 meetings, he is making pungent criticisms of the current global system. He is naming the forces that drive social exclusion and unemployment - speculative financial capital, mindless consumption and waste, individual greed over collective well-being, wanton destruction of nature, all driven by the unregulated power of global corporations.

Pope Francis' analysis was echoed by the grass roots participants who gathered in Rome, along with 30 Bishops and a dozen NGOs and human rights groups vetted by the popular movements.¹ Those who came were united in their condemnation of neoliberal policies that bring destruction to the planet and create sacrifice zones for the young, the old, the weak and the poor, all in order

¹ My own invitation to the event came in recognition of the work of the Steelworkers Humanity Fund, one of several labour international social justice funds in Canada. The SHF has supported homeless movements in Cape Town, the landless in Chiapas and workers in Mozambique.

to re-stabilize a global system driven by powerful corporations and financial institutions whose main beneficiaries are the rich. When the Pope met with the activists he stressed the importance of their actual presence in the Vatican as a signal, drawing attention to what is usually a hidden reality. “The poor not only suffer injustice. They are also struggling against it...the poor are no longer waiting”. (Francis:2014)

It is not by chance that Pope Francis invited these grass roots activists fighting for land and work and housing to the Vatican. The industrial proletariat, mass political parties and national liberation movements that led struggles for social justice in the 20th century are not, today, in the forefront. The patterns of discontent and uprisings are changing. An increase in university tuition fees (Quebec) or a rise in the cost of urban transport (Brazil) or demolition of a park (Turkey) can quickly conflagrate into a mass protest, linking readily with other issues and sources of discontent to prompt thousands to the streets. These grassroots actions, whether urban or rural, are driven primarily by local issues and by ordinary people fed up with being exploited and excluded. There is generalized distrust of politicians and electoral processes and the media. The actions are often emblematic of alternatives - more compassionate societies, more active citizenship, more robust democracies and wiser stewardship of the planet. As Pancha Rodriguez, a rural indigenous women from Chile, said to the group in Rome, “In this era where the planet is under grave threat, smart farming is indigenous farming.”²

Mozambique: From Colony to Socialist Construction to Neoliberal Accommodation

Mozambique is not a country that has been noted for protagonism from the working class and the poor in recent years. A rapid review of Mozambican history confirms this, locates some of the factors at play and begins to document the scope and regularity of protests in recent years. Historically, Portugal offered little democratic space to its citizens in Europe, and even less in its African colonies. Full-fledged settler colonialism under Portugal was established at the end of the 19th century, complete with a “civilizing mission” to bring black Mozambicans from “idleness” into productivity, i.e. forced labour for the colonial state and contract labour to South Africa’s mines. Full colonial governance was established only in the south, with control of the

² For a fuller report on the World Meeting of Popular Movements see Pope Francis’s speech to the delegates available at <http://w2.vatican.va/content/vatican/en.html> and my own report “Challenging the globalisation of indifference: Pope Francis meets with popular movements” available on <http://links.org.au/node/4172>

central and northern regions contracted out to crown companies interested primarily in plantations for agricultural exports like cotton, sisal and tea. In colonial Mozambique, labour or professional organizations were permitted for Portuguese workers and “assimilated” blacks, resulting in unions of dock workers, railway workers, metal workers, etc. Black workers, however, were relegated to cultural associations determined by race with grievances channelled through cultural presentation through music, dance and theatre. Worker resistance tended to be muted. Strikes did occur, among port and railway workers or rural cane cutters, for example, but they tended to be focussed on immediate workplace issues rather than colonialism as such. (Penvenne:1993, 1995; Tinosse 2015).

The strong revenue flows from contract labour to the South African mines and fees for South African and Rhodesian use of port and rail facilities in Maputo and Beira were the main sources of revenue for the colony. Portugal and South Africa established a pattern whereby the Portuguese colonial regime would export – using forced recruitment - at least 100,000 contract workers annually to the mines in South Africa in return for which South Africa would route at least 47.5% of its Transvaal transit trade via Mozambican ports and railways. (Mittelman 1997:182)

In an effort to ward off impending decolonization and provide a safe buffer for the white minority regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa, Portugal opened Mozambique significantly to foreign investors from Europe and South Africa in the 1960s. By 1973, two years before independence, South Africa had replaced Portugal as the main exporter to Mozambique, supplying machinery, spare parts, fertilizers, iron and steel, wheat, potatoes and coal. (Munslow 1993:48).

There was no effective buffer, however, from the sweep of African nationalism that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, rolling southward starting from Ghana in 1957. By the mid-1960s, almost all of the British and French colonies had negotiated their independence. Faced with Portugal’s intransigence, armed national liberation movements were fighting for independence in all three of its colonies in Africa - Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau/Cape Verde. They were closely allied with the liberation movements fighting to end white minority rule in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. These liberation movements in southern Africa quickly gained full political support from the United Nations, military support from the USSR and China, and rear-

guard support from newly independent neighbours in Tanzania and Zambia. By the 1970s, Mozambique also enjoyed support from the Scandinavian countries and Holland in the liberated zones of northern Mozambique.

The composition of the forces of liberation varied in each country. In neighbouring South Africa, for example, a multiplicity of social actors sought to end apartheid over the decades. Some were long established like the ANC which was founded in 1912. The ANC took on increasingly militant tactics over the years with strikes and street protests and the Defiance Campaign. It formally adopted armed struggle in 1961. From the 1970s on, important new internal forces emerged including the black consciousness movement, a resurgent trade union movement, student protests and a broad United Democratic Front. These new actors in the struggle for South African liberation had a complex and often contested relationship with the ANC. (Saul & Bond:2014)

There was no equivalent civil society articulation over the decades within Mozambique. Many of those who eventually led the national liberation struggle earned their political stripes not in Mozambican factory and township struggles but in the heady debates about imperialism and decolonization as university students in Portugal. There they struggled to affirm themselves as Africans and to fight for a Centre of African Studies in Lisbon. They also formed lasting links with future liberation movement leaders from other Portuguese colonies such as Amilcar Cabral from Guinea Bissau and Agostinho Neto from Angola.³

In the 1960s, Mozambican students abroad and the several Mozambican nationalist organizations that had formed in newly independent Zambia and Tanzania, plus youth from the internal student movement, NESAM, converged to form the Mozambique Liberation Front. FRELIMO launched its armed struggle in 1964 from rear bases in Tanzania and Zambia. It established significant liberated territories in northern Mozambique, a laboratory for new forms of participatory democracy and an option for socialism.

After the military coup in Portugal in 1974, FRELIMO became part of a transitional government and formed Mozambique's first independent government on June 25, 1975. With rumours

³ Frelimo veteran leader Sergio Vieira gives a fascinating account of "students from the empire colonialism in the 1960s in his recent biography, *Participei, Por Isso Testemunho*. (Vieira 2010)

rampant of an impending racial blood bath, 90 percent of the settler population of 200,000 took flight. The abrupt departure of managers and technicians, some carrying out industrial sabotage as a parting shot, left the economy in a state of paralysis. FRELIMO's construction of a socialist state led by workers and peasants began, then, in an extremely volatile climate. Where owners stayed, private companies continued to operate. The state intervened as necessary with nationalizations or administration commissions in cases of abandonment, decapitalization and sabotage. (Hanlon 1996; Pitcher 2002; Webster 2005)

Joao Mosca in his cogent analysis entitled "The Socialist Experience in Mozambique (1975-1986)" recalls the moment in this way:

With independence priority was given to the question of establishing power, which meant mainly institutional restructuring and setting up Frelimo structures throughout the territory, political and cultural liberation and affirmation, setting up the army and mobilizing the general population to guarantee popular support and avoid a surge of ethnic initiatives and to resist the already embryonic regional conflict. The big questions related to the economy...were given relatively little importance. The political discourse and the propaganda message emphasized the victories over colonialism, raised the banner of external aggression and the need to support the processes of liberation of people still colonized or ruled by white minority regimes and apartheid (cases of Southern Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. (Mosca 1999:69 My translation.)

The attention of the newly installed Frelimo government was caught at macro level in the "cold war". Western powers made abandonment of the socialist project and FRELIMO's imaginary of deeper socialist transformation a precondition for their support while the USSR made its support contingent on military bases in the Indian Ocean. Frelimo's post-independence discourse focussed on victory over Portuguese colonialism and urged sacrifice and solidarity to build the new Mozambique and liberate the remaining colonies and white minority regimes. The depth of Mozambique's economic subordination to the apartheid regime was rarely made visible. Yet just prior to independence in 1975, South Africa was providing 50-60% of Mozambique's foreign exchange earnings, with another 13% coming from port, rail and pipe lines linking the Beira port to Rhodesia. (Mittelman 1997:182)

By the early 1980s the apartheid regime had mounted a full-scale low intensity war against Mozambique, made the more difficult by being undeclared by the perpetrator and unacknowledged by the victims. South African aggression included economic destabilization,

disinformation campaigns, occasional incursions by South African military forces and increasing support for a surrogate force, RENAMO, wreaking terror in the rural areas and attacking the gains of independence like new health posts and transport infrastructure.

South Africa quickly seized on migrant labour quotas as a key tool for economic destabilization.

...the number of Mozambican mineworkers...tumbled from a peak of 115,000 in 1975 to less than 40,000 in 1983. FRELIMO wanted to cut back the supply of migrant labourers in the future. However, this decline was directly attributable to the decision of the mining industry to vary the countries of origin of foreign labour...as well as to the South African government's desire to punish Mozambique. (Mittelman 1998:193)

By 1983, Mozambique was facing a multiple crisis with a collapsed economy and a serious drought, within the larger context of both the low intensity regional war and the ongoing cold war pressures. On January 30, 1984, Mozambique declared bankruptcy and defaulted on its loans. In March, 1984, it signed the Nkomati Accord, with South Africa, binding each party not to harbour dissident forces fighting against each other's regimes.⁴

From Socialist Construction to Neoliberal Accommodation

Creditors refused to renegotiate unless Mozambique joined the IMF. This was done and over the next few years Mozambique followed the classic IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programme with its mandatory conditionalities of devaluation, privatization, deregulation and cuts in social sector spending. *Noticias*, the national newspaper, announced on the first page of its January 15, 1998 edition that 100,000 workers had lost their jobs during the decade of structural adjustment. (Hanlon 1984; Loxley 1988; Mosca 1993; Marshall 1992).

In 1989, the 5th Congress of Frelimo dropped all references to Marxism-Leninism. The line in the Mozambican workers' hymn celebrating "victories over the manoeuvres of

⁴ While the Nkomati agreement was undoubtedly necessitated by Mozambique's economic collapse and military vulnerability, veteran Frelimo leaders Sergio Vieira and Jose Luis Cabaco give fascinating accounts of Samora Machel's consultations leading up to its signing. His cogent analysis of the correlations of internal forces in South Africa and his questions about the ANC's strategy of armed struggle and its less than robust alliances with other significant anti-apartheid protagonists such as the unions under COSATU and the United Democratic Front are particularly interesting. (Vieira 2010; Cabaco 2001)

imperialism” was changed to “victories over the manoeuvres of the corporations.” The endless war with Renamo abated with a peace agreement signed in 1992. There were further pressures from the IMF and the World Bank to introduce a pluralist democracy that resulted in a new law on union freedom in 1991 and measures to introduce political pluralism. The first multi-party elections were held in 1994, with the original Frelimo leaders holding on to power. They were now strong proponents of neoliberalism, however, presiding over a Mozambique, wide open to foreign investment.

Government, party and military leaders had already shown their adroitness in carrying out a sweeping privatization exercise in which they continue to play a significant role. Anne Pitcher’s studies document how the very centralized Frelimo government took control of the privatization process, carving out roles for senior levels of government, party and military as private entrepreneurs.

The government retains a percentage of total investment. In some capacity, the government is present in almost every major economic undertaking, from agriculture to mining to Mozal to the Maputo corridor. The state still owns and in some cases operates key strategic sectors in the economy such as communications, transportation and electricity. ...Moreover the government has formed partnerships with **all** of the major investors: foreign and domestic investors, black, white and Indian investors in industry, agriculture and commerce; investors in the north and the south. (Pitcher 2002:1773)

The project of creating “people’s power” had proved to be elusive. “Poder Popular” had been the watchword in newly independent Mozambique. Dinamizing Groups were set up in workplaces, communities, schools and universities. FRELIMO used these to transmit messages to – and also from - the base and to create a vehicle for popular participation, mobilizing the energies and euphoria unleashed by independence to maintain production in abandoned work places, take on voluntary work projects like city clean-up or carry out cultural and solidarity activities. FRELIMO launched various initiatives to create “people’s power” and a society led by workers and peasants – massive expansion of basic services including education, health, housing and sanitation, worker participation and control through Production Councils, consumer cooperatives, national literacy campaigns, communal villages, community security brigades, community legal structures.

Workers who, until independence, had endured humiliation from colonial managers and technicians were suddenly valued as the protagonists of the new socialist society. Veteran urban factory workers were offered intensive education programmes to get their school certificates and take on responsibilities in running the workplace. When rentable property was nationalized a year after independence, many workers were able to occupy the houses and apartments of the departed settlers. Although wages remained low, those with secure employment enjoyed many workplace benefits, from special rations to company transport, schooling on company time to workers' holiday camps.⁵

The early years of independence were years of scarcity, but they were also years of hope. Kok Nam, well-known Mozambican photo-journalist, captured the ethos of the time in his images of the euphoria of independence, Samora Machel's charismatic energy and vision for Mozambique, and later, the agony of war and refugees. He was asked years later whether the socialist moment was anything more than a romantic idea.

There were things that were real. Everybody could go to school, everybody had access to hospitals and people had the opportunity to have a house, occupying the thousands of abandoned houses.... And there weren't any rich. We were all poor. But this united us. And the feeling that the figure at the pinnacle of the state was like us, that he was a man of impressive moral character, also united us....Even the shortages. In those days I had to stand in line to buy sugar. Today people approach me on the street to sell me flowers. (EPM-CELP 2010:34 My translation)

The socialist project in Mozambique is woefully under-documented. Existing documentation is often within rigid ideological perspectives, left or right, but little rooted in the often contradictory meanings attached to it by those who lived it. Since the Frelimo leaders in power currently are strong proponents of neoliberalism and have their own private entrepreneurial projects, they show an eagerness to rewrite history, erasing the socialist moment. "Forgetting from above and memory from below"⁶ is the prevailing order today. For working people and the poor, the memory of Samora Machel, liberation movement leader and Mozambique's first president, and of the socialist moment, continues to be evocative.

⁵ Literacy Power and Democracy, my ethnographic study of a workplace literacy programme in 1986 documents how literacy, one of the key instruments for transformation, had been introduced but later eroded by the combined forces of the low intensity war and the hierarchies of power in classroom, workplace and education ministry. (Marshall 1993)

⁶ I have borrowed this phrase from Anne Pitcher's article with this arresting title. (Pitcher:2006)

The socialist moment began to unravel as dramatically as it had begun with both the increasing scope of the low-intensity war, national bankruptcy, famine and the seemingly endemic centralism of the Frelimo government. The propensity for rigid hierarchical control ran counter to all the initiatives to build robust, participatory democratic spaces at the base. Legislative, executive and judicial powers were all concentrated in the CPP [Permanent Political Committee of nine senior Frelimo leaders], a structure superior both to the Frelimo Central Committee and the People's Assembly.

The members of the CPP held a concentration of high positions in the party, the state and the army. The unions (initially Production Councils) and the organizations of youth and women were controlled by Frelimo, not just through the elaboration of their programmes but also in naming those to take leadership positions. The elections for office in these organizations were based on lists of candidates decided on previously by the Frelimo party. (Mosca 1999:78 My translation).

By the beginning of the 1990s working people and the poor were dealing with the harsh impact of the structural adjustment programme, government's fulsome adoption of neoliberalism and the spectre of a small group of government, military and business leaders becoming ostentatiously rich amidst the grueling poverty of the majority. Mozambicans interviewed for a study of the social impact of the Economic Recuperation Programme (PRE) in 1992 told me there was both a "PRE" and a "PRI". The "PRI" was the Individual Recuperation Programme. While the poor were being told to tighten their belts, people at the top were loosening theirs to allow for the expanding girth resulting from rich living.

Signs of Popular Resistance

The beginning of the 1990s brought the first signs of popular resistance with a wave of strikes,⁷ initiated by workers at Tempo magazine and the steel rolling mill, CIFEL, but quickly spreading to the bus companies, Maputo Central Hospital, Maputo City Council and APIE, the state housing authorities. Glass, tire and textile workers also went out on strike. By late January 1990, health and construction workers in Beira, bus drivers in Nampula and coal miners in Moatize had joined their southern colleagues in strike action. When the school year resumed in February, teachers also joined in. (Marshall 1992:52,53)

⁷ The word "strike" is used indiscriminately to describe work stoppages and wildcat strikes as well as legal strikes. Street demonstrations to protest costs of living increases are also often referred to as strikes.

The widespread scope of the strike actions demanded real answers from government. Workers were making legitimate demands. Many of the newly nationalized small businesses had floundered, leaving workers without jobs, with salaries and overtime pay in arrears and no severance. Teachers demanded additional pay for teaching double shifts. Government intervened rapidly with a general 16% wage increase for all workers - and stronger regulations about what constituted a “legal” strike.

There was a “fuel riot” in November 1993, triggered by announcements of a 100% price rise for transport in the “Chapa 100”, the overcrowded and dangerous mini-vans that served as public transport for the poor. There was a spontaneous response from below with 10,000 people going onto the streets on November 24 in Maputo and other urban communities on the outskirts, including Matola, a major industrial suburb. Blockades were improvised at major intersections, text messages providing the means of rough coordination from one part of the city to another.

The main newspaper, *Noticias*, did the math to explain the explosion onto the streets. In 1993, a person earning the government minimum wage earned 70,000 meticaís. Transport to and from work cost 44,000 meticaís with food at work taking another 22,000. Only 4000 MT was left for everything else - housing, food, education and health. Every urban household was forced to find sources of income beyond the wage incomes of its formally employed members. These ranged from multiple jobs to petty trading to connections with families in rural areas producing food. (Chaimite 2014:89)

The people on the streets demonstrating were not workers earning a minimum wage, however, nor did unions give support to the protesters. Those on the streets demonstrating were the poor and excluded. It was unemployed youth and informal sector workers and school children that were on the streets, once blockades were set up, Chapa 100 vans stopped running and schools closed. The demonstrators marched chanting slogans against the higher prices. The blocked roads with rocks, garbage cans and anything that came to hand. They stoned cars and raided stores with sporadic actions continuing in the more remote communities for an entire week. Government claimed sympathy and acknowledged the validity of the complaints but said it could do little to change the situation.

21st Century Motors of Growth: Mining, Oil and Agro-Industry

Industrialization had been adopted as the engine of national development in the imaginaries of the newly independent African states in the 1960s and 1970s, inextricably bound up with modernization, urbanization and proletarianization. At Mozambique's independence, FRELIMO had inherited a not inconsiderable industrial sector that had become firmly integrated into supply chains with South Africa in the final years of colonialism. Much of it had been abandoned and, in some cases sabotaged, by departing Portuguese owners and technicians. Government efforts to intervene and bring workplaces back into productive order were thwarted by a mixture of lack of capital and technical capacity from the Mozambican side and South African economic sabotage. These industrial workplaces were encompassed in the privatization process of the 1980s.

In the neoliberal world order, however, mining, oil and agro-industry reign as the engines for development. As the new century unfolded, Mozambicans found themselves dealing with all three. Major mining transnationals began to build megaprojects with mine, railway pipeline and port complexes shipping ore to world markets. They include mining companies from old imperial centres like Australia's Rio Tinto and Ireland's Kenmare and those from emerging global powers in the BRICS like Brazil's Vale and India's Jindal (Marshall 2014a).

The mines are concentrated in Tete and Nampula provinces. The arrival of these foreign investors was heralded with promises of economic growth, employment and regional development. There is a huge gap, however, between the corporation's job promises and actual employment of Mozambican labour, between the expectations of contracts for local suppliers and the self-sufficient enclave nature of today's big mining companies, between a revenue stream from mining that can strengthen social programmes for all citizens and the less than transparent agreements between government and mining companies based on low rents for resource concessions.

21st Century transnationals in mining are far more articulated to their own operational networks and to global supply chains than to the national economy in which the resource is located. In his essay, "Governing Extraction: New Spatializations of Order and Disorder in Neoliberal Africa", noted American anthropologist James Ferguson makes cogent arguments about the nature of extractive sector enclaves. Far from catalyzing national development, their tendency is to weaken national economic spaces.

... it is worth noting how such enclaves participate not only in the destruction of national economic spaces but also in the construction of “global’ ones. For just as enclaves of, say, mining production are often fenced off (literal and metaphorically) from their surrounding societies, they are at the same time linked up, with a “flexibility” that is exemplary of the most up-to-date, “post-Fordist” neo liberalism, both with giant transnational corporations and with networks of small contractors and subcontractors that span thousands of miles and link nodes across multiple continents... (Ferguson 2006:13)

Further north in Cabo Delgado province bordering Tanzania, there is a boom in oil and gas exploration. The Italian oil and gas operation ENI and Anadarko Petroleum from the US are developing a multi-billion dollar oil project in the Rovuma Basin. This same area has huge gas reserves which, coupled with gas reserves in Inhambane, prompt Mozambican government and business leaders to dream of Mozambique as a future energy super power.

Agro-business is the third component of the neoliberal growth engine and here too, Mozambique is being inundated with new investments. Most prominent is ProSavana. This is a tri-partite project between the governments of Mozambique, Brazil and Japan in the Nacala Corridor in northern Mozambique. Harkening back to the “terra nullius” days of the conquest of the Americas, the programme hopes to occupy 14.5 thousand hectares of land in 19 districts in the provinces of Niassa, Nampula and Zambezia. In Mozambique, 81% of the economically active population depends on agriculture for a living. The ProSavana land grab would replace peasant farmers engaged in family agriculture who presently grow the bulk of food consumed in Mozambique with agro-industry producing primarily export crops like cotton, sisal and soya.

Clemente Ntauazi, Executive Coordinator of ADECRU (Academic Actions for the Development of Rural Communities), one of the civil society organizations strongly critical of ProSavana. He claims that this mega-project in agro-industry calls into question the major collective conquests of national independence, namely, regaining control of the land and of production. The ProSavana No campaign video is entitled “Terra Usurpada Vida Roubada”. “Usurping Our Land. Robbing Our Lives” starts with images of the armed struggle in which Mozambican peasants and youth are fighting to liberate the land from colonial control. The Portuguese settlers had tried to construct the African peasant producers as “indigenous”, claiming them to be uncivilized, idle, “other” with no legitimate claims to land or dignity. Through ten years of armed struggle, however, the Indigenous had triumphed, creating liberated zones at first and finally winning back their entire country from colonial control and their dignity as legitimate protagonists

of history. Some peasant farmers had even won their land back twice, having later fought off Renamo occupation during the post-independence “civil” war during which South Africa supported a surrogate force. Now, in the 21st century, these peasant farmers faced a situation in which their own government was trying to dispossess them of what they had fought for and won, collaborating with foreign investors to retake the land, with the justification that it was “unoccupied” and “unproductive”. (Ntauazi:2015)

As David Harvey argues so cogently (Harvey:2004) , “accumulation by dispossession” is not a concept limited to a “primitive” stage of capitalist development. These predatory practices have been continuous through the historical development of capitalism, and have intensified since the onslaught of neoliberalism in the mid-1970s. “In the neoliberal era, assets previously held under collective ownership, either by the state or in common, have been forced on an unprecedented scale into the realm of the market, often through fraud, coercion, and innumerable forms of predation both by the state and powerful private actors.” (Webber 2008)

21st Century Forms of Protest

As the 21st century unfolds, then, Mozambicans are protesting in a multitude of forms that question the legitimacy of the existing order. The new areas of investment in mining, oil and agro-industry have focussed these questions sharply. Citizen resentment has grown as government has ended any pretense of balancing demands from multiple social actors and catered only to foreign investors and a national business elite that collaborates with them. Peasant farmers find themselves alone and defenceless in the face of land grabs. Workers needs are jettisoned as government equates the interests of the mining and oil companies with the national interest. Pressures for a decent wage or safe working conditions are interpreted as sabotage of the national economy. National union structures endorse the government/corporate embrace, playing their assigned role of ensuring worker submission to low wage strategies. Yet despite government propensity to marginalize and criminalize citizen dissent, popular protest actions continue to grow.

The first of the new megaprojects, the \$1.34 billion Mozal aluminum smelter, was opened in 2000. In many ways, the positioning of the various social actors – corporation, governments, unions, broader civil society organizations both national and international - pre-figures what was to become the pattern. The Mozal case, then, deserves to be studied in some detail.

BHP-Billiton's investment in an aluminum smelter, Mozal, marked Mozambique's full-blown entry into the neoliberal embrace. Mozal was formally opened in 2000, part of a much touted regional industrial development project with South Africa. The Mozambique Development Corridor was designated as an export processing zone (EPZ), linking production sites to the Maputo harbour. The aluminum smelter was the centerpiece, with shares divided among BHP-Billiton (47%), Mitsubishi (25%), South Africa's Investment Development Corporation (24%) and Mozambique government (4%). Mozal was opened triumphantly by President Joaquim Chissano in September 2000. President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa was at his side, heralding Mozal as emblematic of the "African Renaissance."

Behind the high-flown political rhetoric was a hard-nosed business deal. Cheap power was a key component. South Africa's powerful Anglo-American had taken advantage of Portugal's decision to open Mozambique for investment in the 1960s and became a shareholder in the Cahora Bassa dam and hydro-electric project. Mozambique had been supplying low-cost power to the South African state electricity company, ESKOM, since that time. ESKOM in turn had been supplying this cheap power to BHP's two aluminum smelters in South Africa. MOTRACO, a private company, also enjoying EPZ privileges, was set up to supply cheap power to Mozal.

BHP got other major economic advantages. Proximity to the Maputo port reduced shipping costs. EPZ status eased regulatory procedures and import/export tariffs. Mozal was granted a 15 year corporate tax exemption. BHP also benefitted from Mozambique's Least Developed Country designation under the Lome Convention. Aluminium exports to EEC countries from Mozal got a 6% tariff reduction unavailable to BHP's exports from South Africa. (Pretorius 2000)

South Africa also benefitted from Mozambique's weak environmental and labour infrastructure. A hasty environmental assessment was carried out by a South African institution not known for its rigor. (Pretorius 2000) BHP was able to take advantage of weak trade unions in Mozambique, in marked contrast with the combative unions like Numsa which represented BHP workers in South Africa. The Mozambicans unions were still closely linked to the government and had no experience in dealing with transnational companies.

The Mozal construction phase was marked by strong labour conflicts. BHP brought in South African sub-contractors, each bringing a core group of its own workers. Operating from strong stereotypes of Mozambican backwardness, the sub-contractors automatically allocated the skilled, high-paying jobs to South Africans. A representative of SINTICIM, the Mozambican Construction, Wood and Miners Union, recalled the moment some years later. He said that the union had advised its members not to protest, but to accept the unskilled jobs, prove themselves in practice and hope for a higher category in the next phase. (Marshall 2014)

Once the smelter became operational, even stronger labour protests emerged. The new generation of technical and administrative workers employed by Mozal had impressive levels of training, skills and even supervisory experience. They also had high expectations about employment by a transnational corporation. They were shocked to learn that officials from the Mozambican Metalworkers Union, SINTIME, had already been wined and dined by BHP in South Africa. Even more disconcerting, SINTIME had returned with a collective agreement. It included not just general principles but detailed job classifications and salaries with huge salary differentials. Virtually all the Mozambican workers were placed in the lowest classification. The agreement gave away the right to strike, claiming continuous production in the aluminum smelter was “essential”, ILO definition of what constitutes “essential services” notwithstanding. (ITUC: 2009). Furthermore there was a clause stating that this agreement took precedence over other existing labour agreements in Mozambique. English was established as the language in the workplace and foreign workers were paid in dollars while Mozambicans were paid in the rapidly devaluing local currency. (Pretorius:2000)

The first workplace Union Committee elected at Mozal took on BHP-Billiton in a “David and Goliath” contest. Their first hurdle was to persuade BHP to recognize Mozambican labour law. The second was to reopen the job classifications and salary scale. Despite efforts by government mediators and later, by a team of “independent” arbitrators including lawyers from Mozal and SINTIME, there was an impasse. Mozal went ahead to announce a new salary schedule for 2001, with no union input. In February, 200 workers carried out a one-day work stoppage to protest expatriate pay levels. Frustration levels ran high among the workers. Many had successfully completed Mozal’s maintenance technician training. After graduation, they were told to reapply.

The only positions open, however, were for lesser paid maintenance assistants, even though the graduates now constituted the entire Mozal maintenance staff.⁸

Finally in September 2001, a formal strike notice was given. The union accepted Mozal's request for a meeting the day before the strike deadline, still hoping to avert a strike. The meeting continued until 7 pm. Union members went home, assuming resumption the next morning. Meanwhile workers entering at 9 pm found Mozal management had been acting in bad faith. The shift was prevented from entering by 200 armed riot police and police dogs surrounding the smelter. Although BHP never officially declared a lock-out, the union soon learned that ex-BHP workers from South African had been flown to Mozambique and hired on as scabs, lured by BHP's offer of US\$200/day and luxury beach hotel accommodation. (Pretorius 2001)

BHP felt little pressure to settle since production continued with the scab workers. It took full advantage of the situation to undermine the new union, using home visits, emails and newspaper ads to persuade workers to drop their demands and return under the existing conditions. There was little public support. Common sentiment was that Mozal workers already earned more than most and were foolish to take on a powerful company like BHP.

The Mozambican Workers Organization (OTM) issued a statement characterizing the workers' demands as "fair and legitimate" and BHP's position as "intransigent and inflexible". Nine days into the three weeks strike/lockout, however, Mozambique government – itself a Mozal shareholder – weighed in firmly behind BHP and urged the broader labour movement to reject worker demands. During the government-organized OTM 18th anniversary reception, President Chissano strongly criticized the Mozal workers, claiming that attracting a big investor like BHP represented a huge victory for Mozambique.

This [Mozal] is the bait to attract other foreign investment"... "but now there is a danger that this will all be brought down".... The workers who say they are suffering injustice at Mozal are not the poorest workers", he added. "We have many workers who are much poorer".... We have to find a solution which ensures that Mozal remains a basis for

⁸ BHP had tried to carry out the same manoeuvre in South Africa, but Numsa took them to court and won. (Motau 2003) In Mozambique, Mozal carried out the manoeuvre successfully.

attracting the projects that are essential for the elimination of unemployment and absolute poverty. (AIM 2001)

With government allied with BHP and almost half their members back at work in the smelter, the local union leaders dropped their demands. Despite earlier promises of no disciplinary action, BHP refused to reintegrate the 40 workers they labelled as strike leaders, including four of the six elected union leaders.

While Mozambican government and national union leaders were urging the BHP workers at Mozal to back down, the BHP workers in South Africa were militant in their solidarity. Stewards at BHPs Bayside and Hillside smelters interrupted every scheduled meeting with the company with a motion to place Mozal on the agenda. Shifts reported for work refusing to pick up their tools until the scabs were brought back from Mozambique. Numsa was highly embarrassed that ex-Numsa members had been enticed into scabbing. Numsa officials met with BHP and the Industrial Development Corporation in Johannesburg. They felt they had the makings of a deal that could break the impasse in Mozambique and proposed a joint BHP, IDC, Numsa mission to Maputo under the aegis of the International Metalworkers Federation. They also lobbied for an International BHP Billiton Council. (Motau, 2003)

Numsa was one of the initiators of an exchange in Maputo in November 2001⁹ to lay the groundwork for an international campaign to reinstate the 40 Mozal workers. Simeao Nhantumbo, SINTIME Secretary General at the time, commented on the strike, saying “what was won or lost in the first major project would have big implications for what workers would be able to achieve in other major investment projects.” Yet shortly thereafter, Nhantumbo officially informed Numsa that it was no longer welcome in Mozambique and that Numsa’s contact with Mozal workers was tantamount to foreign interference in Mozambique’s internal affairs. (Motau 2003)

The Mozal events at the beginning of the millennium set the pattern for future labour struggles. The best educated and technically trained workers in Mozambique had tried to use the existing trade union structures to defend themselves. When they pushed the company for a better contract, they found themselves pitted against not just Mozal but also

⁹ Participants in the exchange include Numsa, Steelworkers Humanity Fund, ILRIG, FES, SINTICIM (national) and SINTIME (national, provincial and plant levels. Minutes were prepared by Judith Marshall.

against their own government, against the wider Mozambican labour movement and even against general public opinion. When unions representing BHP workers in other countries offered solidarity, they were denigrated as foreign agitators. Even elected worker leaders got no protection from company reprisals. The lessons were not lost on other local union leaders throughout Mozambique.

Old and New Forms of Protest

Chill effect from the Mozal strike notwithstanding, the first decades of the 21st Century have seen a growing number of popular protest actions at workplace and community levels, both urban and rural. Work stoppages and wild cat strikes involving small numbers of workers have been frequent, neither organized nor sanctioned by the unions. Workers were faced with a government intent on luring foreign investors by offering implicit, if not explicit, promises of cheap, compliant labour. Noted Mozambican economist Carlos Nuno Castel-Branco captures succinctly how the labour system was, and is, negatively articulated to the broader political economy.

... the dominant political economy of Mozambique is focused on three fundamental and interlinked processes, namely the maximization of inflows of foreign capital – FDI or commercial loans – without political conditionality; the development of linkages between these capital inflows and the domestic process of accumulation and the formation of national capitalist classes; and the reproduction of a labour system in which the workforce is remunerated at below its social cost of subsistence and families have to bear the responsibility for maintaining (especially feeding) the wage-earning workers by complementing their wages... (Castel-Branco: 2015)

Major bread riots again put thousands of citizens on the streets of Maputo, the national capital and smaller regional centers in 2008 and 2010. Only massive police presence and blocked cell phone communication averted another major street protest in 2012. (Chaimite 2014; de Brito et al 2014; Bertelsen 2014) These cell-phone organized street demonstrations were triggered by government decisions to increase the costs of basic foods, fuel and/or transport. The main participants were the poor and excluded, trapped in endemic poverty with growing murmurs of resentment against the luxurious life-style of the elite. The street demonstrations in 2008 were sparked by a government decision to raise the prices of diesel and gasoline. There was an immediate response at community level. While Mozambique government touted impressive economic growth indicators, much of it based on aluminum exports from Mozal, the situation for most Mozambicans was a daily grind of poverty and exclusion. The government responded

rapidly, condemning the demonstrations and sending in army and police to restore order. It also made concessions with withdrawal of the new tariffs and promises to make some compensation to the Chapa 100 owners in return for their cooperation in regularizing licenses.

In September 2010, messages began to circulate about another major street protest, this time triggered not by fuel prices but by increases in the prices of basic products. There was a 17% increase in the price of bread alone plus higher costs for water, electricity, and basics like rice, onions and tomatoes. The text message mobilizing people to go to the streets referred to the protest as a “general strike.”

Mozambicans, prepare yourselves for the general strike 01/09/2010. We protest at the rise in the price of bread, water, electricity and others. Send to other Mozambicans. Wake up. (Text message of 31/09/2010)

This time government responded quickly, finding ways to channel subsidies to bakery owners and transporters. Clearly the uprisings got responses. Early in 2011, government even announced a basic food basket for those at poverty level because of rising grain and fuel prices. The bill was publicly criticized as inconsistent and unsustainable, with no viable eligibility study. It would benefit urban areas, focal points of the protests, while rural poverty remained untouched. In the end, the measure was dropped. (de Brito 2014:32)

While most demonstrators were peaceful, the street actions in 2010 also entailed violence. Barricades were set up using tree trunks and garbage containers. Demonstrators set fire to cars, burned tires, and threw rocks at police car. Demonstrators looted shops taking home sacks of rice and other food. In some case, the police, also underpaid, joined in the looting. (de Brito 2014:21) Government sent in repressive forces, ill-trained and equipped, unprepared for a volatile situation with their own neighbours on the streets. In 1993, one person died and 50 were injured. In 2008, at least three people died and more than 200 were injured. In 2010, more than a dozen people lost their lives and more than 500 were injured.

Popular musician Azagaia was accused of instigating the demonstrators with his song “Povo no Poder” (People in Power), recorded after the 2008 demonstrations and sung again in 2010. The weekly paper, Savana, criticized the public prosecutor’s office for trying to suppress the protest song and published the lyrics in full.

Mr. President, you left the luxury of your palace
You finally noticed that life's not easy here
Only now did you call a meeting of your Council of Ministers
But the people haven't been sleeping
We came together a long time ago
We've barricaded the streets
We've halted the minibuses
No one is getting past
Even the shops are shut
If the police are violent
We'll respond with violence. (Savanah 3/9/2010)

By 2012, there were rumblings of another bread riot. OTM had come to the 2012 tri-partite discussions on minimum wage with a study costing basics for a family of five at 8,021 MT/month. Yet business and government continued to insist on taking sectorial productivity indices as the predominant reference point and established minimum wages per sector that averaged only 3,305 MT/month or 41% of what the unions considered an adequate basic wage. (de Brito 2014:14). The minimum wage for large-scale mining was set at 3525 MT/month. In a round of bargaining with Vale that year, the company lauded itself for paying more than the minimum wage when it established a monthly minimum salary of 6305 MT/month for Vale employees. While this was considerably more than the government minimum, it was still a good deal less than what labour economists had calculated to be a living wage, i.e. 8021 MT/month.

On November 15 and 16, 2012, increases in transport fares were announced causing immediate tension and a flurry of texting about street action. This time government took rapid measures to avert the protests, mobilizing phone companies to restrict texting communications and ordering a massive police presence. (de Brito 2014:20) Only a few barricades were mounted and the protest ended quickly.

The weak and deformed Mozambican unions at the beginning of the 21st century were inadequate instruments for a new generation of workers contending with the power of

transnational investors. An extensive international study on the nature and state of union organization in Mozambique was carried out in 2002. It characterized the situation as follows:

While retaining a residual presence in many workplaces, Mozambican unions have battled to cope with changes in the external labour market and a greatly altered political climate. In most cases, they have proved equally incapable of challenging the authority of management and of articulating viable alternatives to the neo-liberal orthodoxy. There is a need to enhance the *quality* of unionism and the *service* provided at existing workplaces.... (Webster 2005:258)

The study, based on a sample of 177 workers in Maputo and Beira, revealed that less than half those interviewed had a local union executive actually elected by the members while 35% were in workplaces where management itself had appointed the members of the union executive. Only 41% came from work places where unions were actually recognized as the bargaining agents for the members and only 25% reported that their employers actually complied with all or a large extent of what was in the collective agreement. (Webster 2005:267-270)

Union membership had declined dramatically from 300,000 members in the early 1980s to only 90,000 in 2003 (Webster 2003:262). As the Webster study points out, however, “a more serious, but insidious, problem to that of union decline in numerical terms is ‘residual’ or ‘hollow’ unionism; where for historical-institutional reasons, a union retains a presence, but is no more than a passenger in an enterprise driven by autocratic managerialism.” (Webster 2003:258)

As the 21st century unfolded even more obscene levels of rich-poor disparity came to prevail, and new groups of citizens took up the quest for social justice. Government service delivery of the basics like health and sanitation and transport decreased, while corruption grew. Workers throughout the country continued to fight back with wildcat strikes and work stoppages, with the union’s only role being one of pacification. The “autocratic managerialism” of big mining companies did indeed dominate labour relations. The new investors were quick to take advantage of the “hollowness” of the existing trade unions.

The table below, while still far from complete, gives some indication of the range of protest actions from year to year. “Strikes” predominated in the form of wildcat strikes and work stoppages, almost none of them were carried out by workers in a “legal” strike position with organizational support from their union. They “strikes” were led by small groups of workers, fed up with “autocratic managerialism” in companies where the unions were simply “passengers”.

The dispossession experienced by peasant farmers in the face of land grabs by mining, oil and agro-business was certainly the most blatant. Workers and the urban poor, however, also had a more subtle but equally acute sense of dispossession. All the gains of the first years of independence were now a distant memory. On my first visit to liberated Mozambique in 1976, I had spent evenings with the Dinamizing Group in the urban neighbourhood where I was living. We were painting huge cloth banners of the victories of the first year of independence. They included land, housing, access to schooling and health care, price controls on basic commodities (later Consumer Coops), along with the more intangibles of respect and dignity and solidarity. These banners were later festooned on the lamp-posts along Eduardo Mondlane Avenue for independence celebrations. By 2000, the commitment to a basic needs agenda that encompassed all citizens was only a distant memory. There were only much deteriorated public services for workers and the poor while a government/military/business elite now had access to private education and clinics, luxury home and vehicles and consumer goods.

At moments of prices increases for food or fuel or public transport, there were food riots, characterized by government as hooliganism and met with police repression but understood as acts of citizenship by others. Michael Sambo and Kajsa Johansson in their article “Bread Riots: Exercise in Citizenship?” probe the concept of citizenship and how immediate causes like prices increases are merely the tinder to cause a conflagration. The rapid conflagration is fueled by a generalized sense of being fed up with living in a society where ordinary people have no voice and where the sufferings of the general population are worsening while the ostentatious living of the political and economic elite is on the increase. (Johansson, K. & M. Sambo: 2014)

Whatever the immediate cause of a work stoppage or a street demonstration, the larger context was a general sense of dispossession and latent discontent. In addition to strikes and work stoppages, there were all kinds of other protest actions. Barricades, whether of rocks and trees or of human beings, effectively brought ore trains to a halt or prevented access to a mine site. There were also moment of global protest with Mozambican organizations increasingly involved in larger global civil society initiatives.

Data/Place	Action	Protagonists	Targets	Issues
2001				

Feb Maputo	work stoppage	200 Mozal workers	BHP-Billiton	high expat salaries, racism
Oct Maputo	strike/lockout	Mozal workers	BHP-Billiton	salary & benefit levels/respect
2005				
Nov Maputo	classes boycott	university students	UEM admin	bursary conditions
2006				
Oct Ilha de Mocambique	work stoppage	Municipal workers	Moz gov	2 month salary arrears
2007				
Mar Moma	work stoppage/riot	Kentz construction workers	Kentz/Kenmare	salaries, severance, racism
Aug Xinavane	work stoppage	sugar cane cutters	Acucareira de Xinavane	salaries, working conditions
2008				
Feb 5 Maputo Chokwe	bread riots	urban poor, youth, unemployed	Moz gov	transport price hikes
2009				
Mar Moatize	wildcat strike	1200 construction workers	Odebrecht/Vale	salaries, working conditions, severance
May Moatize	work stoppage	construction workers	Odebrecht/Vale	hrs of work, ex-pat salaries & benefits
Aug Marromeu	work stoppage	seasonal cane cutters	Sena Sugar	salaries, transport, labour relations
Sept Marromeu	general strike	3000 seasonal workers	Sena Sugar	salaries, work conditions, ex-patriate salaries
2010				
June Maputo	open SOS letter	civil society (JA, LDH, CTV, CIP etc.)	Mozal, Moz gov	environmental hazards
July Nampula	work stoppage	plantation farmers	Corredor Agro	wages, health care, dismissals
Sept 1,2 Maputo	bread riots	urban poor, youth, unemployed	Moz gov	price hikes, rich/poor gap
2011				
April Moma	wildcat strike	Kenmare workers	Kenmare	salary scale, job classifications
Sept Maputo	official letter of protest	Justica Ambiental in name of resettlers	Vale	Cateme resettlers w/out land, water, etc.
Dec Moatize	official letter of protest	Cateme resettlers	Vale, Moz gov	land, houses, water, livelihoods
2012				
Jan 10 Moatize	rail road blockade	700 resettled families in Cateme	Vale, Moz gov	broken promises and silence from Vale & gov
July Moma	strike notice	Kenmare bargaining committee	Kenmare	wages, health care, foreign workers
Sept Nacala	wildcat strike	Kentz construction workers	Kentz	severance, Labour law implementation
Nov Maputo	food riots	urban poor, youth, unemployed	Moz Gov	cost of living, corruption
Nov Changara	work stoppage, attacks on ex-pats	Jindal workers and affected community	Jindal, Moz Gov	no enviro study, insults, no resettlement plan
Dec Maputo	legal strike	retail workers	Shoprite	low pay, no
2013				

Jan Maputo	doctors/nurses strike	Moz. Medical Assn	Moz Gov	salary and work conditions
Apr Moatize	mine blockade	800 block makers	Vale, Moz Gov	loss of livelihoods
May Moatize	railway blockade	Cateme block makers	Vale	compensation for loss of small business
May Maputo	open letter against ProSavana land grab	23 Nat'l and 43 int'l civil society orgs	Moz, Brazil and Japanese Govts	land grabs, agricultural policies
June Maputo	work stoppages	doctors, nurses	Moz Gov	salary, work conditions
July Changara	Demonstration	Jindal workers and community	Jindal, Moz Gov	work conditions, abuse, pollution
Aug Maputo	open letter against ProSavana	20 Moz orgs	Moz, Brazil and Japanese govt	land grabs, agricultural policy
Aug Moatize	demonstration at Vale offices	block makers	Vale	response to new compensation proposal
Oct 4 cities	peace and security march	30,000 civ society & NGOs	Moz Gov, Frelimo & Renamo parties	no war resumption, security from kidnaps
Dec Moatize	mine blockade	25 de September resettlers	Vale	compensation for lost livelihoods
2014				
May Moatize	blockade threats	block makers	Vale	no Vale response
July Maputo	II Triangular People's Conference	civil society reps Brazil, Japan and Mozambique	Moz, Japanese & Brazilian Govts	land grabs for agro-industry, dispossession
Sept Moatize	mine blockade	resettlers and block makers	Vale	land grabs, dispossession
Oct Maputo	III Intl Conference on Land & Seeds	UNAC and other civil society orgs	Moz Gov	lands grabs, genetically modified seeds, agricultural policy
Dec Maputo	march of Men against violence	Men	General public	rape, harassment of women
2015				
Jan Changara	work stoppage	Jindal mine workers	Jindal, Moz Gov	"slave labour" conditions, racism
Mar Maputo	protest march	3000 students and civil society	Moz Gov	drive-by shooting of law professor Gilles Cistac
Apr Maputo	World March of Women international mtg	300 international delegates	Moz and other governments	Impact on women of land, forest and mineral resource grab
May, Changara	Mine blockade	500 families of four affected villages	Jindal, Moz gov't	False promises of land, resettlement, jobs and better living conditions
June, Moma	Work stoppage	900 Kenmare miners	Kenmare, Moz gov't	Lay-offs, reduction of night shift bonus

Sources: Compiled by author from Noticias, A Verdade, CIP, ADECRU, O Pais, Meusalario.

Worker and Community Protests at the New Mines: Odebrecht/Vale, Kenmare and Jindal

BHP's aluminum smelter was the first extractive sector project but the new millennium quickly saw the arrival of more investors including SASOL (natural gas), Kenmare (mineral sands), Vale/Odebrecht (coal), Riversdale (coal) and Jindal (coal). Riversdale later sold to Rio Tinto and in 2014, Rio Tinto sold the mine to ICVL, a joint venture of 5 Indian state companies endeavouring to guarantee coking coal for Indian steel production. One of the partners, state company Coal India has subsequently withdrawn. Case studies of these mining companies reveal the dynamics of contemporary labour protests.¹⁰ Not surprisingly, the big mining companies exhibited all the tendencies of "autocratic managerialism" already identified, often using their Mozambican Human Resource directors to work out a modus vivendi with their trade union "passengers" that guaranteed labour peace.

Brazilian mining giant Vale with construction giant, Odebrecht, its regular partner for ventures in Africa, was the company that initiated the coal boom in Tete. Vale has morphed from the state-owned mining company, CVRD (Sweet River Valley Company) founded in 1942, to the privatized CVRD of 1997. A state auction whose legality is questioned up to today put CVRD's grossly undervalued assets into private hands. Today we have the sleek 21st century Vale, seen by the elite in Brazil as a success story that epitomizes Brazilian competitiveness in the global economy and the growing power of the BRICS. Vale ranks as the third largest mining company in the world with operations in 13 states throughout Brazil and 27 countries around the globe.

During Lula's first presidential visit in 2003, conversations with then President Joaquim Chissano included the possibility of Vale's building Mozambique's first coal mine. Vale won the competition to carry out feasibility studies in 2004, got an operating license in 2007 and in 2011, officially went into production, after a glittering opening with several plane loads of Mozambican government and business leaders being jetted from Maputo to Tete for the

¹⁰ The three case studies of worker and community resistance that follow are based on situations that I monitored closely in my role as coordinator of the Steelworkers Humanity Fund's programme in Africa from 1993-2013. The Steelworkers international development and solidarity fund gave annual support to training projects with SINTICIM, the construction and mining union, starting in the mid-1990s. In 2009, SINTICIM requested hands-on collaboration from USW in health and safety training with a focus on the new mining unions. This placed me in a "participant-observer" position during a crucial period. The depiction of resistance in the new mining communities draws heavily on these experiences.

celebration. Odebrecht, the Brazilian construction giant, was responsible for the construction of the mine.

In 2010, groups in Brazil took the initiative to organize an International Articulation of People Affected by Vale. Vale had acquired nickel mines in Canada whose workers were affiliated with the USW. The Steelworkers become active participants in the network in their own right and also supported active participation by union and community groups from Mozambique. In the ongoing hands-on collaboration with SINTICIM, the training team was expanded to include trade unionists from Vale operations in Canada and Brazil and a South Africa health and safety activist. On-line follow-up with the trainers for further information and support was encouraged. The skype and email communications ranged from puzzlement about what “ergonomics” was all about to requests for advice about how to respond to an HR Director’s offer of a company credit card to shock and horror at company cover-up of the death of a young heavy equipment operator, left pinned for three hours under his over-turned compactor without rescue or first aid.

These new mining projects resulted in both old and new forms of protest. As with Mozal, the construction phase was marked by labour conflicts. In 2009, there were two work stoppages in less than two months, the second involving 1200 workers. Their main issues were low salaries, working conditions, hours of work, loss of week-ends off and management arrogance. The labour law stipulated a norm of eight hour days, 42 hour work weeks and week-ends free but also provided flexibility for alternative patterns by individual employers. The construction consortium of Odebrecht, Vale and sub-contractors quickly took full advantage of the flexibility, intent on rapid construction of the new mine. Locally-based construction workers, contracted project by project, had enormous difficulties interpreting their rights in the midst of the rapidly shifting context.

The new mining projects were touted by Mozambique government as creators of jobs and economic development and poverty eradication. Yet the agreement with Vale included a quota of 15% foreign workers, ostensibly with a training component. The Provincial Director of Labour complained to a union delegation from Canada in 2011 that the mining companies were inundating her with work permit requests for people without training capacity like a cook from Brazil. In 2012 Lula Ignacio da Silva, esteemed labour leader and ex-president of Brazil, travelled to Mozambique with Vale President Murilo Ferreira. While there Lula gave a public

lecture on “The Struggle Against Inequality” and urged Brazilian investors to contribute to poverty alleviation in Mozambique. He also joined the Vale president, however, in lobbying Helena Taipo, Minister of Labour, to allow higher quotas of foreign workers for Vale’s future projects – which she refused to do. (Verdade 2012).

A Vale sub-contractor, Kentz, brought in several hundred Filipino construction workers who were housed in an encampment surrounded by barbed-wire while they carried out short-term contracts. Complaints about the wage differences between the Mozambican and foreign technicians were a constant irritant. The perception was that local Tete residents were left out while jobs went to foreigners, illegal immigrants from Zimbabwe and Zambia and the sons and nephews of the elite in Maputo.

The wild cat strikes at Odebrecht also used texting to organize, making identification of leaders elusive. During the 2011 work stoppage, messages circulated urging workers to congregate in the dining hall two days later. They gathered, without coherent demands but with a generalized sense of frustration that quickly turned into random destruction of company property. The Provincial union head was called in to pacify, along with government labour officers and armed police.

At Mozal, the newly formed Union Committee had quickly created a strong, collective voice in defence of the rights and interests of the workers. Employees of the foreign mining companies in Tete had no strong Union Committees to channel their demands. One of Vale’s first actions in Tete was to offer a vehicle to the provincial head of the construction and mining workers union. When members criticized him, the SINTICIM leader justified his acceptance saying it would allow him to visit workers in remote mining sites. Yet when Vale workers from Brazil and Canada taking part in a tri-national health and safety training programme met with the Moatize District Administrator in 2010, the Administrator spoke openly of the mining companies’ practice of buying off local government, labour and community leaders. He offered the SINTICIM acceptance of a vehicle from Vale as an example.

According to workers in the Odebrecht/Vale Consortium formed in the construction phase before workers had direct contracts with Vale, this same provincial SINTICIM head rigged the election of the first Union Committee. (Sekame 2013) After calling a workers assembly he instructed

each department to meet and elect its representative to the Union Committee. When the official list circulated, however, elected candidates from two departments had been dropped. They were replaced with two men who had worked with the provincial union head in the Carbomoc mine during the 1970s. One was named as head the Union Committee and the other as treasurer. The two proceeded to make the air-conditioned union office into their personal lunch room. The local union bank account was used as their personal social fund. (Sekame 2013)

The technical workers elected a well-qualified civil engineering technician who, to the surprise of many, took the task seriously. Shortly after the local Union Committee was formed, the technician was asked to participate in a tri-partite meeting with Labour Inspectorate, company, and union. The Human Resources director accosted the technician en route, praising his work, promising future contracts and suggesting that during the meeting, the technician keep his mouth shut. When the Labour Inspectors asked for union input, the Provincial Secretary opted for silence, despite recent wildcats. The project was ending without definition of severance pay or recall rights for future projects. There was simmering discontent about salaries, overtime pay and arbitrary disciplinary measures and dismissals.

The technician broke the silence with a long list of worker concerns. His intervention was met with hostility on all sides, including that of the government. Many Labour Inspectors supplemented their inadequate government salaries by waiving fines in return for cash payments from the companies which they pocketed. Union leaders actually putting labour issues onto the agenda of official meetings cut off their under the table deals.

After the meeting, Odebrecht demoted the technician and accused him of fomenting strikes. Not long after, Odebrecht dismissed him on trumped up charges related to a heated verbal exchange when he unmasked the ongoing pilfering of local union funds. Despite complete exoneration both from the provincial court and from a petition process through the National Assembly, Odebrecht refused reinstatement and shunted the case to a regional court. Clearly Mozambican workers attempting to defend their members through use of labour law and existing union and government structures found themselves up against not just the power of the transnational companies but also the weight of government - and union – indifference and corruption.¹¹

¹¹ For a fuller account, see Marshall 2014

While good labour laws existed on paper, with both union and government structures set up to enforce their implementation, there were other logics and practices that prevailed within a porous world of favours and loyalties and under the table arrangements. Indeed the practice of labour inspectors being bribed into waiving fines was so endemic that the new labour minister, Vitoria Diogo, called attention to it during her first meetings with her staff in March 2015.

(Noticias:2015)

African states generally, post structural adjustment and within the prevailing discourse of neoliberalism, have been rolled back, hollowed out to the point of leaving few qualified people and inadequate budget for salaries or programmes. Mozambique falls readily into this category. Government officials no longer govern. They trade, using whatever wherewithal their particular position in the status apparatus allows. At the bottom, traffic police trade waiving fines for bills inserted in a driver's license, bureaucrats trade influence or information or priority treatment for cash, teachers trade marks for sexual favours. At the top government and army officials trade in arms and drugs and high-stakes deals with foreign investors.

Alongside, and interpenetrated with, the formal institutions of the state, informal networks of officials, local power brokers or warlords, arms traders and international firms in many countries form... a "shadow state" that leaves the formal institutions of government little more than an empty shell. (Ferguson 2006:39)

"Residual" union leaders articulated readily with officials of the "shadow state" and the "autocratic" mining companies in highly promiscuous relationships with both, all to the detriment of workers and mining communities.

The same company director who had bribed the provincial union head with a vehicle micro-managed the inexperienced local Union Committee eventually formed at Vale. He allocated an office on company property with a computer and three hours/week for union matters. Hours could not be used simultaneously, however, ruling out collective planning and problem solving. Elected leaders still had to meet full production quotas, another deterrent to taking time away from production to make the union function.

Community Struggles Against Vale

The protests against the new mining investments by workers have been more than matched by the actions from the surrounding community, where people have been robbed of their lands and

their livelihoods. The land grabs linked to the new mining projects have created situations of desperation for peasant producers. The recurrent protest actions from the 1360 families resettled by Vale in 2009/2010 have been well documented. (Mosca & Selemane; JA, ADECRU 2013; HRW 2013) Perhaps the most dramatic action was the first railway blockade. In December 2011, the community in Cateme, Vale's rural resettlement, had once again made a list of all of their demands. They found themselves, almost 2 years after resettlement, still without land suitable for farming, still without water, still in houses that had started cracking after the first rainy season, still without compensation. Visitors were taken to the Vale show pieces in Cateme, a well-landscaped clinic and school, and a model farm which was an oasis of green, thanks to daily tending by Vale agronomists and tubed irrigation. Meanwhile, life for the resettlers in their rows of match box houses and treeless streets was desperate. They had lost not only land and livelihoods but also their independence. They now found themselves wards of a foreign mining company and their own government, neither of whom exhibited any political will to resolve their situation.

The community handed in their demands to Vale and government December, 2011, giving January 10 as deadline for a response. None was forthcoming. To the surprise of Vale and the Mozambique government, the Cateme community took direct action and blockaded the road and railway lines, effectively stopping transport of coal to the port in Beira. The government reaction was swift and excessive, sending in an armed police rapid response unit. Fourteen community members were imprisoned, one blind and one lame. Five were rapidly released but four of the nine who spent time in prison were brutally beaten. Vale acknowledged that there were problems and promised solutions within six months. A hostile climate prevailed, with strong police and security presence making contacts between the settlers and their NGO advocates very difficult. The most tangible Vale response was forcing the resettled families into tents while the houses were patched up. Three months after the railway blockade, Vale offered three vehicles to local government authorities in Moatize, two of which went to the District Administrator and the police commander. (JA 2014:12)

Since 2012, there have been other strong protests and repeated blockades despite the passage of new legislation on resettlements on August 8, 2012 which states that those directly affected by economic projects have the right to be re-established at a level of income and in living conditions

(house, physical space, and social infrastructure) equal or superior to their former situation. (Bila 2015).

Many of those resettled had lived for generations making building bricks from local clays. They constructed small kilns close to the clay deposits where they formed and fired their bricks. Some introduced a small quantity of cement into their bricks; some used moulds for decorative bricks. In 2009, Vale had paid compensation of 60,000 MT for each functioning kiln and given access to the Vale concession to remove previously produced bricks. The brick makers had understood this as an initial payment, however, and continued to demand more. Neither Vale nor government was sympathetic. At one bargaining session, a government official had cynically queried why bother with inferior local blocks when Moatize now had a “Builder’s Warehouse” full of high quality building supplies from South Africa.

In May 11, 2013, the block makers met Vale again, armed with new proposals based on what block makers could have expected in life-time earnings from their businesses. They presented a new formula for calculating compensation which took annual production (102,000 blocks) x price (2 meticaís) x years of productive life for a block maker (50 years). Vale dismissed the new demands as illusory and said the matter was definitively closed. The response of the block makers came two day later when they blockaded the railway line again. (O Pais 2013)

At the end of 2013, the families in 25 de Setembro, the peri-urban resettlement took action. Neither Vale nor government had responded to their letter demanding compensation for land loss. The families cut down branches and set up blockades on major access roads to the Vale mine, effectively paralyzing production. None of the issues around resettlement has yet been settled, the 2012 legislation notwithstanding. Seemingly neither Vale nor the Mozambique government has the political will to do so. (ADECRU 2013).

Mining Case Study 2 Kenmare’s Remote Mineral Sands Mine

The Kenmare Resources’ mine, Moma Titanium Minerals, opened in Nampula in 2007, was actually the first major mining project. Kenmare is an Irish mining company with its head office in Dublin. Its principal activity is operation of the Moma Titanium Mineral Mine, a mineral sands complex with mining carried out through dredging operation and immediate transport to ships carrying the minerals to global markets. It is in a remote area of the province; many

workers have permanent residence in other parts of the province and intersperse lengthy periods of consecutive shifts at the mine site with long blocks of time off.

Kenmare, like all the extractive companies, presented itself to both government and community leaders as a source of local employment for both direct employees and suppliers, as well as a bearer of local development. Even during construction, hopes faded with the arrival of sub-contractors, all bringing foreign workers. The problems in the construction phase were similar to those at Mozal. On March 23, 2007, for example, Mozambican construction workers employed by one of Kenmare's sub-contractors, Kentz Engineering, rioted violently at the remote mine site. The main issue was non-compliance with Mozambican labour law on severance pay. Workers had contracts for indeterminate periods and, by law, were owed severance on project completion. Another issue was retention of white workers while higher-qualified Mozambicans were terminated. Responses by company, government and union were predictable. The Kenmare director urged Kentz to comply with Mozambican labour law. The provincial Ministry of Labour sent investigators. The government sent armed troops. (WAMPHULA 2007) SINTICIM, the construction workers union was silent.

Workers in the remote Kenmare mine initiated an independent union to deal with work issues, only later affiliating with SINTICIM. The Kenmare workers carried out two rounds of bargaining with the company in which they made significant gains. They also carried out a work stoppage in April 2011 with demands around salary scales, job classifications and compliance with Mozambican labour law. The workers only agreed to suspend the action after a tri-partite commission of three members each from company, union and government was formed to resolve the issues.

The union's 2012 bargaining proposals were prepared with care, including skype consultations with a Brazilian health and safety expert met at one of the earlier tri-national exchanges. The proposals included a 40% salary increase, a 13th month salary, a medical plan and a phased replacement of foreign workers with Mozambicans. The SINTICIM General Secretary made last minute contact ordering postponement until his arrival. The union bargaining committee proceeded, briefing the SG on arrival but limiting his role to advisor only. Bargaining reached an impasse and the union took a strike vote, all as prescribed under labour law. Kenmare came back to the table. After several tense days with the strike threat hovering, a settlement was

reached with workers gaining much more than Kenmare's initial offer. Meanwhile, the Mozambican government had ordered armed police to the mine site.

The Kenmare workers were jubilant about their victory, won entirely through their own efforts. They began to question continued dues payment to a union that offered them nothing in return. The dues were being deducted at source and sent directly by Kenmare to SINTICIM. Ninety percent stayed with national and provincial SINTICIM offices with only ten percent reverting to the union at plant level, and even that arrived only sporadically. Meanwhile the SINTICIM national and provincial offices provided no services, no legal support to defend against disciplinary charges and dismissals, no economic studies to support bargaining, no training except when a foreign donor financed a course, no information or communication tools.

The Kenmare Union Committee decided to instruct the company to start paying the dues into a newly-opened Kenmare Union Committee account. They were able to gather the more than 300 signatures necessary to ratify their decision to terminate their affiliation with SINTICIM. These were sent to the Ministry of Labour, Kenmare and SINTICIM. There was no immediate reaction, nor has there been since

Shortly thereafter, however, the SINTICIM Secretary General expelled the Secretary who headed the Kenmare Union Committee Secretary and the Treasurer. He informed Kenmare of the expulsion, and claimed that the local union Secretary's participation in a conference and training programme with Canadian Steelworkers six months earlier had been a clandestine visit, unauthorized by SINTICIM. Furthermore, he accused the Secretary of deceiving the company and stealing union dues. Finally he accused the Secretary of "contacts and involvements with a foreign organization which has shown itself to be manifestly against the implementation of the investment projects for the economic and social development of Mozambique and for its fight against poverty. This foreign organization makes use of emails and Facebook to carry out its intentions, including recruitment of foreigners coming from Canada, Brazil and...South Africa." (Timana:2012).

These were thinly veiled references to the Steelworkers, with whom SINTICIM had had cooperation projects for more than a decade. The foreigners recruited were, in fact, the trade unionists from Canada, Brazil and South Africa who had participated in the tri-national health

and safety seminars from 2010 – 2012 as a gesture of international solidarity. In the same way that Numsa's collaboration with the new Union Committee at Mozal was labelled as foreign interference and rejected by SINTIME in 2001, the collaboration of Canadian and Brazilian and South African unions to strengthen the new unions in the mines was labelled as foreign interference by forces against Mozambique's development and repudiated by SINTICIM in 2012.

Kenmare promptly dismissed both the local union head and the treasurer, presumably grateful to SINTICIM for providing ammunition for dismissal of young workers who had just won some victories in a round of tough bargaining. The remaining elected leaders were threatened with further dismissals if they questioned SINTICIM's actions, including its arbitrary appointment of substitutes for those dismissed. With their jobs on the line and the combined forces of company, government and union all aligned against them, the Kenmare workers backed down, leaving an atmosphere of resentment and fear at the mine.

Mining Case Study 3 – Jindal, another BRICS investor

The tumultuous history of Jindal Steel and Power, the Indian transnational working the newest of the big coal mines in Tete, began even before its formal opening in August 2013. Jindal is a diversified industrial conglomerate which has operations in 13 countries in Africa. Jindal Africa is headquartered in Johannesburg. There was widespread labour unrest in November 2012, prior to Jindal's opening, which resulted in intervention by the Ministry of Labour and expulsion of two Indian directors.

Mozambique's Minister of Labour, Helena Taipo, has cancelled the work permits of two Indian citizens, Manoj Kumar Pandey and Ram Many Pandey, with immediate effect.... The two men were the director of human resources and the coordinator of operations of the company MGC, which has been subcontracted by the Indian company, Jindal Steel and Power, for work on its coal mining concession.... The two Indians are accused of repeated violations of the Labour Law and of the Mozambican Constitution. ... they mistreated and insulted the 250 Mozambicans working at the company. They also made "false promises" to the Mozambican workers, and failed to provide them with work contracts and with protective equipment. No record was kept of overtime worked, and neither the company nor its workers were registered with the National Social Security Institute (INSS). Furthermore, the company did not provide any clean drinking water for its workers. The behaviour of the MGC management led to a strike last week.... The two Indians even denied access to the company premises to the brigades sent by the provincial government and the police who were attempting to reach a solution to the workers' grievances. ()

Less than a year later, on July 22 and 23, 2013, the issues of the Jindal workers and the residents of the rural community around the mine erupted. People from four communities congregated at the Jindal office. Two of these communities were directly affected by the open mine pit. The crowd attacked the Jindal staff members, wounding one in his office and three in their homes. Neither the Jindal security guards nor the three adjacent police posts could calm the agitated crowd.

Jindal was accused of broken promises. On arrival in 2008, Jindal had promised no coal extraction before resettlement but resettlement location and date were still pending. Jindal had promised no farm occupation without negotiation but had, in fact, occupied land with crops ready for harvest. Jindal had promised a full environmental impact assessment. None had been done. Jindal had promised to build wells and water supply. None had been built. People found themselves prisoners in their own land, locked inside the mining concession, suffering the dangers and pollution of living within a functioning open pit coal mine. All of this notwithstanding, President Armando Guebuza presided over the formal opening on August 13, just a month later.

In January 2015, the workers carried out their third work stoppage since the mine opened. Some 250 workers decided to shut down the mine to force Jindal and government to deal with a series of labour injustices. The grievances against Jindal and its lack of compliance with Mozambican labour law were many. The issues included contracts of only six months duration, salaries incompatible with those in other coal mines in Tete, huge distinctions between Mozambican and expatriate salaries, unequal pay for equal work among the Mozambicans, irregularities in social security payments, no health and safety equipment, no registration of overtime hours, abusive behaviour by management, hiring illegal immigrants from Zimbabwe and Zambia for lower pay, sub-standard housing, food and sanitary conditions for workers, just to name a few. A recent lengthy report on Jindal in the Mozambican weekly, *Savana*, quotes an Indian manager as having said aloud that the Mozambicans had nothing to complain about because they lived in a poor country with few alternatives for survival and should be thanking God for what they were earning. (*Savana* 2015)

Raul Senda, the *Savana* reporter, likened the situation he found at Jindal to modern slavery. Jindal representatives were unavailable for comment and the provincial labour department said it

was writing a report on the situation. (Savana 2015) If the reporter had asked the Jindal workers about the union's role, he would have learned that, in fact, the Jindal workers have refused to have anything to do with the SINTICIM provincial secretary and resisted all his efforts to form a local Union Committee affiliated to SINTICIM in their mine.

Mere Survival Strategies or a New Citizen Protagonism?

Most Mozambicans are among the poor and dispossessed of the planet, discardable to make way for the mega-projects that siphon out non-replenishable resources for world markets or grab away land for agro-industries, all carried out through the active mediation of their government and party leaders. Past revolutionary credentials notwithstanding, the post-independence leaders of the 21st century in Mozambique, and indeed in the other countries in southern Africa, fit perfectly with Algerian psychologist Frantz Fanon's perceptions in the 1960s of the failings of post-independence leaders in Africa.

The national middle class discovers its historic mission: that of intermediary. Seen through its eyes, its mission has nothing to do with transforming the nation; it consists prosaically, of being the transmission lines between the nation and a capitalism, rampant though camouflaged, which today puts on the masque of neo-colonialism. The national bourgeoisie will be quite content with the role of the Western bourgeoisie's business agent, and it will play its part without any complexes in a most dignified manner. But the same lucrative role, this cheap-jack's function, this meanness of outlook and this absence of all ambition symbolize the incapability of the national middle class to fulfill its historic role as a bourgeoisie. (Fanon 1966:124)

The 21st century has seen a growing resistance in Mozambique. A new generation of workers has tried to make use of the existing unions, despite the heavy weight of corrupt and inept residual structures. Several young union leaders have lost their jobs for doing so. When legal strikes do not work, the workers revert to wild cat strikes and impromptu work stoppages. When the levels of injustice and arbitrariness get too much, they revert to destroying company property or products. SINTEL, a new union for extractive sectors workers was authorized by the Minister of Labour in 2014. Its leaders have set out with a commitment to building strong unions at workplace level and active links with other social movements. They will face powerful adversaries along the way, not least of which are their own limited experience of trade unionism and the lack of a political culture in Mozambique that includes strong labour and social movements.

Communities of peasant producers throughout rural Mozambique whose lands and livelihoods and independence have been robbed in order to make way for megaprojects in mining and agribusiness are also inventing practical ways to say “enough is enough”. They stop the trains carrying coal to the port for export. They block roads and rails and entrances, forcing production to a halt in the mines and plantations. They internationalize their situation through social media and global civil society events and counter-events.

Amidst the changing patterns of protest and discontent, a broader spirit of resistance and vision of alternatives is beginning to emerge. The sense of dispossession may be most acute for those subjected to land grabs for mines and agro-exports, but there is a growing awareness of dispossession on the urban streets which is felt as much in Maputo as in Sao Paulo or Athens. The pervasive neoliberal ideology has persuaded governments everywhere to adopt austerity, which means cuts in social sector spending and abdication of responsibility for the basic needs of its citizens for jobs, food, housing, health care and transport. In Mozambique, the post-independence gains in schooling, health and housing are now a distant memory. For many, having a job just means joining the “working poor” rather than the “jobless poor”. Free, universal education has come to mean overcrowded schools, underpaid teachers and constant demands for money from home. Some of it is for books, uniforms and pencils but there are also demands for money for everything from the school electricity bill to student outings. Many parents understand these requests to be coming from teachers-turned-traders. The money extracted from parents supplements the teachers’ inadequate incomes. The doctor’s examination is futile when there is no means of buying the prescribed medications. The sense of abandonment by the state is profound. It is exacerbated in Maputo by dispossession from the streets themselves, all forced to scramble for safety from cavalcades of expensive cars with sirens marking the passage of a member of the elite, moving from government office to palatial home to international conference centre.

An important new aspect of these contemporary forms of resistance in Mozambique is that they are not neatly understandable within what may be referred to as a “vertical topography of power”. The 20th century view of resistance tended to pit “local” unions and communities with “authentic” leaders organizing at the “grassroots” against a repressive state encompassing both imperial capitalism and local dominant classes. The resistance was played out within national

boundaries. (Ferguson 2006:106). This image of resistance from below and repression from above, however, misses the horizontality of the contemporary world. Transnational corporations today exercise their global power through horizontal flows rather than the more vertical concepts of nation states. The enclaves of the extractive sector, far from promoting national development, tend to disorganize national economic spaces as they create more horizontal global ones with their supply chains and their self-sufficient operational networks linking various continents and supra-national trade and banking institutions.

Civil society organizations have also begun to work these horizontal spaces, thereby creating new instruments of governmentality. The nation-state is not replaced; instead it now co-exists and interacts with this new apparatus of global civil society which, for its part, invents new forms of struggle. Globally networked and globally imaged organizations and movements create mechanisms of governmentality that operate outside and/or parallel to the national state. While the new apparatus may represent grass roots concerns, the power it holds is exercised not just locally. Through claims related to such issues as stewardship of the planet or protection of universal human rights, it operates from a wider global spatial and moral purview than just that of a national state. Mozambican organizations now have connections, whether operating alone, or in networks, or as part of civil society organizations with a global presence. These range from Friends of the Earth to Via Campesina to Amnesty International to UN civil society platforms. These new structures of horizontal governmentality tackle the supra-national institutions that today buttress neoliberal capitalism, from transnational corporations themselves and free trade and investment agreements to the transnational apparatus of banks, international agencies, and market institutions.

As we have seen, the workers and communities affected by Vale are venturing into these horizontal structures to take their resistance forward. Organizations in Mozambique are connected to the International Articulation of People Affected by Vale, for example. This means giving and receiving information regularly with other workers and communities affected by Vale in Brazil itself but also in Canada, New Caledonia, Peru and Indonesia. The network members write counter reports to Vale's annual Sustainability Report, they intervene in Vale AGMs, they campaigned globally to have Vale named the Worst Company in the World at Davos in 2012.

The resistance to ProSavana is being propelled forward partly through Via Campesina, a global structure linking agricultural producers. Mozambique has already hosted an international Via Campesina meeting in Maputo. Strong connections with Brazil's powerful Landless People's Movement already existed when ProSavana came onto the agenda of struggle. This helped in organizing a new form of resistance, the Triangular Peoples Conferences involving civil society groups from Brazil, Japan and Mozambique, the three countries whose governments are supporting the project.

Pope Francis' extraordinary initiatives through the Pontifical Justice and Peace Commission constitute a new part of this emerging global apparatus of governmentality. Mozambican activists were among the more than 100 representatives of the poor and excluded at the first World Meeting of Popular Movements in October 2014 in Rome. A second meeting was held in July 2015 in Bolivia with 1500 activists. In August, there was another gathering in Rome co-organized with the Churches and Mining network. The Pope's message included a call for a paradigm shift in global mining. In the same month, 60 mayors were invited to Rome to strategize about climate change and how to urge national governments to take stronger positions.

Through these initiatives, Pope Francis is establishing a new supranational moral discourse around economic institutions and financial systems that create widespread poverty and discard the poor, that promote mindless consumerism and a throw-away culture while destroying the earth, our common home. These initiatives with their universal moral imperative create new, horizontal spaces of contestation. The claims transcend national states and engage with institutions where power is being exercised from transnational corporations themselves to market and banking institutions and investment protection treaties.

The challenge is to invent new discourses that capture 21st century realities and find forms of protest that target the points where power is being exercised with greatest impunity and where inequality and destruction of the planet are being exacerbated most blatantly. These resistance strategies may be triggered by desperation and survival strategies. They gain momentum, however, by a wider sense of dispossession in contemporary capitalism. It may be most acute through the increasing land grabs by aggressive mining, oil and agro-business investors. As Occupy Wall Street revealed, however, there is also a strong sense of dispossession among the 99% more generally. In Mozambique, it may focus on the loss of the post-independence

entitlements for all to citizenship, dignity, land, housing, education and health care. These hard-won rights are now being given away to foreign companies by a government that has ceased to assert national sovereignty. In Canada, it may focus on remembered securities of the post-war welfare state with life time jobs and cradle to grave social programmes and secure pensions. Wherever the resistance is rooted, it points to the urgent need to question the supremacy of the market as determinant of global well-being and halt the corporate insistence that tries to commodify everything.

While the resistance strategies may be triggered by the need to survive, they also carry in them the seeds of a different approach to building more democratic compassionate societies with more popular protagonism and more effective ways to care for the planet. The 21st century strikes, bread riots and blockades in Mozambique can take their place proudly as part of the broader panoply of global resistance at a moment in history characterized by grotesque rich-poor disparities and unregulated corporate power.

REFERENCES

- AIM. 2001. President Chissano Criticizes the MOZAL Strike. www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique_news/newsletter/ain217/html. Accessed on February 4, 2015.
- Bertelsen, B.E. 2014. Effervescence and Ephemerality: Popular Urban Uprisings in Mozambique in *Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology*. http://www.academia.edu/8056852/_Effervescence_and_Ephemerality_Popular_Urban_Uprisings_in_Mozambique_Ethnos_2014_10.1080_00141844.2014.929596-OPEN_ACCESS_
- Bila, Iracema Malopue. 2015. Communities abandoned and trapped in mining zones in Tete. Maputo: Savana 06-02-2015.
- de Brito, L., E. Chaimite, C. Pereira, L. Posse, M. Sambo and A. Shankland. 2014. Hunger Revolts and Citizen Strikes: Popular Protests in Mozambique, 2008-2012. Food Riots and Food Rights project report. Brighton/Maputo; Institute of Development Studies/Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Economicos. www.foodriots.org.
- Cabaco, Jose Luis (2001) *THE NEW MAN (Brief History of a Project)* in Antonio Sopa. *SAMORA Man of the People*, Maputo: Maguezo Editors, pp 103-111.
- Cabral, Amilcar (1967) *Revolution in Guinea: An African People's Struggle*, London: Stage 1.
- Castel-Branco, Carlos Nuno. 2015.
- Chaimite, Egidio. 2014. Das Revoltas as Marchas: Emergencia de um Repertorio de Accao Colectiva em Mocambique in Luis de Brito et al. *Desafios para Mocambique 2014*. Maputo:IESE.
- EPM-CELP. 2010. KOK NAM o homen por detras da camara. Maputo: Escola Portuguesa de Mocambique/Centro de Ensino e Lingua Portuguesa.
- Fanon, Frantz. 1966. *The Wretched of the Earth*. New York: Grove Press.
- Ferguson, James. 2006. *Global Shadows Africa in the Neoliberal World Order*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Francis. 2014. Address of Pope Francis to the Participants of the World Meeting of Popular Movements. October 28, Rome. http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2014/october/documents/papa-francesco_20141028_incontro-mondiale-movimenti-popolari.html
- Hanlon, Joe. 1996. *Peace Without Profit*. Oxford:James Currey.
- Harvey, David. 2004. The “New” Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession. In *Socialist Register Volume 40*. Pontepool:The Merlin Press.

HRW (Human Rights Watch). 2013. O Que e Uma Casa Sem Comida: O Boom da Mineracao em Mocambique. Maputo:Human Rights Watch.

International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). 2009. Internationally Recognised Core Labour Standards in Mozambique: Report for the WTO General Council Review of the Trade Policies of

JA!Justica Ambiental.2012. Direitos comunitarios, Violacao corporativa. Maputo: Justica Ambiental.

Johannson, Kajsa and Michael Sambo. 2014. As revoltas do pao: um exercicio de cidadania. Unpublished paper presented at IESE Conference, Maputo, September 2014.

Jose, Andre Cristiano. 2005. Neoliberalismo e crise de trabalho em moçambique. O Cabo dos trabalhos: Mozambique (Geneva 22 and 24 April, 2009).

http://cabodostrabalhos.ces.uc.pt/n1/documentos/200611_neoliberalismo_mocambique.pdf

Accessed July 10/14.

Marshall, Judith. 2014. Workers in the Neo-liberal World Order: Relations with Corporations, Governments – and Their Unions. Accessible on

<https://www.dropbox.com/sh/l8pjalqd5evpyh4/AACTRSGE2suuHpEyjH30nOwia/judith%20Marshall.pdf?dl=0>.

Marshall Judith. 2002. Interview with Hlokoza Motau, Numsa Secretary of International Affairs.

Marshall, Judith. 2001. Minutes of the Mozal Exchange, November 2001. Unpublished

Marshall, Judith. 1993. Literacy, Power and Democracy in Mozambique *The Governance of Learning from Colonization to the Present*. Boulder:Westview Press.

Marshall, Judith. 1992. War, debt and structural adjustment in Mozambique: The social impact. Ottawa:The North South Institute, Ottawa, Canada

Mittelman, James H. 1988. Out from Underdevelopment Revisited. London; Macmillan.

Ntauazi, Clemente.2015.Resistance to ProSavana in Mozambique. www.plaas.org.za/plaas-publications/ADC-pres-mozambique

Mosca, Joao. 2014. Producao Alimentar: Um problema central para resolver. Destaque Rural no 3. Maputo: Observatorio do Meio Rural (OMR). <http://omrmz.org/images/publicacoes/D3.pdf>

Mosca, Joao. 1999. A Experiencia Socialista em Mocambique (1975-1986) Estudos e Documentos 4. Lisboa:Instituto Piaget.

Mosca, Joao. 1994. Programa de Ajuste Estrutural: alguns aspectos teoricos e los principales temas de debate. In Revista de Fomento Social, No. 193, Volumen 49, Cordoba; ETEA.

Mosca, Joao and Thomas Selemene. 2012. Mega-projectos no meio rural, desenvolvimento do territorio e pobreza: o case de Tete. In L de Brito etal Oorgs. Desafios para Mozambique 2012. Maputo:IESE.

Motau, Hlokoza. 2003. Interview with Hlokoza Motau, International Secretary, Numsa. Johannesburg:2003.

O Pais. 2013. "Oleiros de Cateme Voltam a Barricar Linha-ferrea. Available at <http://opais.sapo.mz/index.php/sociedade/45-sociedade/25341-oleiros-de-cateme-voltam-a-barricar-linha-ferrea.html>. Accessed on March 22, 2015.

Penvenne, Jeanne. 1995. African Workers and Colonial Racism; Mozambican Strategies and Struggles in Lourenco Marques, 1877-1962. London: James Currey

Penvenne, Jeanne. 1993. Trabalhadores de Lourenco Marques, 1870-1974. Maputo:AHM.

Pitcher, M. Anne. 2006. "Forgetting from Above and Memory from Below: Strategies of Legitimation and Struggle in Postsocialist Mozambique". *Africa* 76, 1 (2006), pp. 88-112.

Pitcher, M. Anne. 2002. Transforming Mozambique The Politics of Privatization 1975-2000. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Pretorius, Leon. 2000. Regional integration and development in Southern Africa: A case study of the MOZAL Project and its implications for workers. Occasional Paper No. 4, ILRIG, Cape Town. http://vufind.carli.illinois.edu/vf-uiu/Record/uiu_6565761. Accessed on July 24, 2014.

Saul, John S. and Patrick Bond. 2014. South Africa The Present as History. Woodbridge, Suffolk:James Currey.

Sekame, Samuel. 2013. Interview with Samuel Sekame. Tete March 2013. (Real name withheld.)

Timana, Jeremias. 2012. Letter to Kenmare Resources, November 29, 2012. (Unpublished letter copied to suspended worker who made it available to author).

Tinosse, Herman. 2015. O "silencio" dos sindicatos e a ascencao da luta dos trabalhadores\ economia, politicas e estrategias dos trabalhadores Mocambicanos, 1983-2013. Unpublished.

Verdade.2012. Lula faz lobby para a Vale Mocambique-@Verdade Online. www.verdade.co.mz/newsflash/32919-lula-faz-lobby-para-a-Vale. Accessed July 24, 2014.

Vieira, Sergio.2010. Participei, por isso Testemunho. Maputo:Editorial Ndjira.

(WAMPHULA FAX - 23.03.2007)

Webster, Edward et al. 2005. Residual Unionism and Renewal: Organized Labor in Mozambique. In *Journal of Industrial Relations*. Vol 48 (2).

Judith Marshall

Judith Marshall is a Canadian labour educator, writer and global activist who has travelled extensively in Africa and Latin America. She worked in the Ministry of Education in Mozambique for 8 years and on her return to Canada, wrote her doctoral thesis on a literacy campaign in a Mozambican factory. She has

recently retired after working for 20 years in the Department of Global Affairs and Workplace Issues of the Canadian Steelworkers union. Her work included education of USW members on global issues, project management in southern Africa and global exchange programmes linking workers and community organizations affected by transnational mining companies.